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Medical- Legal Problems of
Organ Transplantation
By VICTOR R cHARDs, M.D.*
MEDICINE and the Law are currently confronted with three great
revolutions: (1) the Industrial and Technological Revolution, (2) the
Scientific Revolution, and (3) the Genetic Revolution. These revo-
lutions have raised the following questions in both the legal and medical
fields: Which doctor can save life? Which patient is dead? Which per-
son shall receive the benefit of organ transplantation? Who shall have
the right to live? Which laws shall govern life and death for the
individual? Rational solutions to these complex problems require, and
will demand in the future, the clearest thinking and sharpest decisions
of our finest medical and legal minds. The critical forces in society are
clearly becoming not only economics, politics, and the flow of capital,
but also technological innovation, scientific advance, and genetic en-
gineering. Evolution in technology and science is inevitable and scien-
tific advance has increasing relevance not only to the medical commun-
ity but to the legal community as well.
Medicine and Law have a common ultimate goal: serving the
public good and interest. Every man feels and senses the problems in
his environment. The bedrock assumptions remain: (1) that man is
capable of understanding his problems with insight, wisdom and in-
telligence; and (2) that man is capable of making laws dealing with
these problems-preserving the rights of the individual, yet serv-
ing in the public interest.
Science and medicine, to advance, must be free of dogma and
orthodoxy. The laws must be practical, philosophical, ethical, just, and
equal. Evolutionary change in both medicine and law is desirable,
and indeed, inevitable. Nevertheless, it is not the objective of bringing
science under the law, but the common goal of enriching life and its
quality that guides the scientific and legal transitions.
It is in this general frame of reference that we now approach the
problems of tissue and organ transplantation as they influence individual
* Chief of Surgery at Children's Hospital, San Francisco, and Professor of
Surgery at University of California, San Francisco Medical Center and Stanford Uni-
versity Medical School.
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and communal life. The technological goals have been achieved; it is
now simple to transfer any organ or tissue from one individual to
another, with the exception of the brain. Science has progressed
to where it is possible with potent drugs and sera, to sustain the
life of transplant recipients for long periods of time; but the quality of
life, duration of benefits and cost of sustaining life still remain open
to critical medical and legal appraisal. This article will focus on the
scientific and eugenic problems remaining in organ transplantation, and
the legal problems involved. As will be seen, the problems with refer-
ence to paired organs (such as the kidneys and lungs) are quite differ-
ent from problems with respect to single organs (such as the heart and
liver) and our analysis of the problems will deal largely with trans-
plantation of kidneys, as the dual organ transplant, and the heart as the
single organ transplant.
I. Kidney Transplantation
Over 20,000 patients die each year in the United States from such
major renal diseases as tumors, nephritis, pylonephritis, and polycystic
kidney disease.1 Approximately 8,000 of those dying are individ-
uals in the 5-60 age group, the group that includes virtually all of
the kidney recipients.2 Therefore, it can be estimated that by 1977,
5,000 kidney transplants will be required annually if renal transplan-
tation is to fulfill its potential as a remedy for renal disease.3
There are four sources of kidneys for transplantation: (1) artificial
organs; (2) animals; (3) a cadaver; (4) a live human donor. The possi-
bility of developing a small artificial kidney that can be implanted in
man certainly exists.
In light of new developments, small tubular membranes can be
packed into a unit that is small enough to be transplanted, yet has
sufficient surface to permit the filtration of toxins out of the blood
stream.4 At the present time, however, such artificial kidneys are not
available and we are confronted with the necessity of using other sources.
1. See Couch, Supply and Demand in Kidney and Liver Transplantation: A
Statistical Survey, 4 TRANSPLANTATION 587, 588 (1966).
2. Scribner, Ethical Problems of Using Artificial Organs to Sustain Human Life,
10 TRANSACTIONS AM. Soc'Y ARTIFICIAL INTERNAL ORGANS 209 (1964).
3. Moore, Burch, Harksen, Swan, Murray & Lillihei, Cardiac and Other Organ
Transplantation, 206 J.A.M.A. 2489, 2490 (1968) [hereinafter referred to as Cardiac
Transplantation].
4. See generally Levine & La Course, Materials and Design Consideration for a




Grafts from nonhuman animals have been tried,5 but have been
entirely unsuccessful thus far in solving the problem of kidney trans-
plantation.8 No xenograft has lived longer than nine months; and
during the period the xenografts were in place, the grafted individual
was completely incapacitated. 7 At the present time efforts to use xeno-
grafts have been abandoned until further research reveals methods with
a greater possibility of success.
The third source of kidneys for transplantation is the cadaver.
Each cadaver could supply two kidneys; but not all cadavers are ac-
ceptable for transplantation. In fact, medical studies on cadavers have
suggested that only about 7 percent of the persons dying in a hospital
environment could be considered potential donors.8 The ideal donor is
a young person who dies as a result of a brain tumor, an accident, or
in the course of cardiac surgery. Excluded as donors would be per-
sons dying of systemic infection involving the kidney, persons with
cancer, and persons with a transmittable disorder.
Unfortunately, the kidney is a very complicated organ which be-
gins to deteriorate rapidly after its blood supply has ceased. It is
essential, therefore, that the kidney be removed as early as possible after
death; after a one hour delay the kidney becomes so badly damaged
that it will no longer function in the transplanted state.' The require-
ment of immediate removal, together with the other medical problems
accompanying death, limits the number of cadaver kidneys available for
transplantation. If the kidneys from all dying persons were automati-
cally available, however, the logistical problems of matching donor and
recipient by tissue type and of transporting donor or recipient to the
site of the transplantation would be greatly diminished.' 0 Also required
5. Grafts from nonhuman animals to man are termed xenographs. The oper-
ation is known as heterotransplantation. 1 ScnmiDr's ATTORNEY'S DICTIoNARY OF
MEDicnm 407 (1969).
6. Starzl, Marchioro, Peters, Kirkpatrick, Wilson, Porter, Rifkind, Ogden,
Hitchcock & Waddell, Renal Heterotransplantation from Baboon to Man, 2 TRANS-
PLANTATION 752 (1964). See Perper & Najarian, Experimental Renal Heterotrans-
plantation, 4 TRANSPLANTATION 377 (1966).
7. Vasco, Transplantation of the Heart, 117 AM. J. SunGERY 344, 350-51
(1969).
8. Couch, Curran & Moore, The Use of Cadaver Tissues in Transplantation,
271 N. ENO. J. MED. 691, 693 (1964).
9. Nakamoto, Straffron & Kolff, Three Years' Clinical Experience With Cadaver
Kidney Transplantation, 5 TRANSPLANTATION 854, 855 (1967).
10. Virginia recently added the following section to its medical examiner statute:
"In any case where a patient is in immediate need for an internal organ as a transplant,
the Chief Medical Examiner or his deputies where a decedent comes under their
jurisdiction; who may provide a suitable organ for transplant and there is insufficient
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is a workable system for the exchange of information regarding the
availability and location of possible donors. One noted specialist ex-
plains the problem as follows:
Potential donors often do not die in institutions performing kidney
transplants, so that from the standpoint of transplantation teams
there is a maldistribution of cadaver donors. But if logistics had
been perfect, patients dying with subarachoid hemorrhage could
have supplied about 10,600 kidneys for the 7,644 potential kidney
recipients."
Sufficient exchange of information, provisions for the rapid transpor-
tation of transplant organs across state boundaries, and availability of
organ storage equipment 2 would have made many of these kidneys
available for transplantation. 3
time to contact the next of kin of the decedent in order to maintain the viability of
the organ to be transplanted, and no known objection by the next of kin is foreseen
by the Chief Medical Examiner or his deputies: the Chief Medical Examiner or his
deputies may in their discretion where providing the organ for transplant will not inter-
fere with the subsequent course of the investigation or autopsy provide such organ on
the request of the transplanting surgeon." VA. CODE ANN. § 19.1-46.1 (Supp. 1968).
Since kidneys must be removed, either for transplanting or storage, within one hour
after death (note 9 supra), this statute may provide many opportunities for the med-
ical examiner to act immediately without awaiting permission from the next of kin.
The Texas Legislature has recently (Apr. 17, 1969) enacted a similar law. It pro-
vides that when a prospective donor dies under circumstances which might require an
autopsy, the medical examiner of the county is to be immediately summoned. He is re-
quired to go to the transplant facility and determine if an autopsy is required. "(c)
If an autopsy is required, the medical examiner . . . will examine the organ to be
transplanted in its whole state and will examine any other clinical evidence on the con-
dition of the organ. (d) The organ to be transplanted will then be released to the
transplant team .... ." VERNON'S TEXAS SEss. LAW SERv., ch. 336, § 1, at 1033-34
(1969), amending TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. art 49.25 (1966).
This statute could make available for transplantation kidneys which might other-
wise be lost in the delay normally accompanying an autopsy. Similarly, once success-
ful cardiac storage facilities are developed, the statute might prove a valuable source of
transplantable hearts. For the present, the brief period of transient allowable in heart
transplantation precludes successful invocation of this legislation. See text accompanying
notes 51-52 supra.
11. Couch, Supply and Demand in Kidney and Liver Transplantation: A Statis-
tical Survey, 4 TRANSPLANTATION 587, 595 (1966).
12. Many doctors are currently exploring methods for the prolonged preser-
vation of organs, using either low temperature techniques, which reduce the metabolic
needs of the organ, or perfusion of the organ with appropriate nutrient media. At the
present time livers have been successfully transplanted after 8 hours and kidneys
after 24 hours of perfusion. Success of various storage methods will make many
organs, now lost from rapid degeneration after death, available for transplantation.
Belzer, Ashby, Huang & Dunphy, Etiology of Rising Perfusion Pressure in Isolated
Organ Perfusion, 168 ANNALS OF SURGERY 382 (1968); Gleason & Murray, Report
from Kidney Transplant Registry: Analysis of Variables in the Function of Human
Kidney Transplants, 5 TRANSPLANTATION 360 (1967).
13. See Typing and Matching for Kidney Transplantation, 99 CAN. MEDIcAL
ASS'N J. 1011 (1968).
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The fourth source of kidneys for transplantation is the living donor.
Transplantation of kidneys between identical twins' 4 was accomplished
in the late 1950's' 5 after studies demonstrated that genetic identity
between the donor and recipient invariably permitted the successful
transplantation of a kidney. In the early 1960's attempts were made to
transplant kidneys between individuals who were not genetically iden-
tical.' There was no significant survivals until sufficient knowledge of
graft rejection led to the proper use of immunosuppressive agents.' 7
14. A transplantation between identical twins is known as a syngenesious trans-
plant. 2 ScmErDT's ATToR NY's DIcnONARY OF MEDicINE 779 (1968).
15. M. WOODRUFF, THE TRANSPLANTATION OF TissuEs AND ORGANS 535-37
(1960).
16. Cardiac Transplantation 2490.
A transplantation between two individuals of the same species but of different
genetic constitution is known as a homograft or an allogeneic transplant. 1 SC HmIDT's
ATTORNEY'S DIcnoNARY OF MEDICINE 414 (1969).
17. The main immunosuppressive agents which have been developed since 1960
include immuran (azathioprine), actinomycine, X-Ray therapy, and cortiocosteriods.
Cardiac Transplantation 2490.
No one can currently predict when the immunological barrier to the transplantation
of organs will be overcome. The elinicial results in transplantations, particularly in
kidneys, have been so successful that it has defied comprehension of the basic immu-
nologists. The distressingly poor results in cardiac transplantation have been predicted
by the basic immunologists and, indeed, many of them feel that further transplantation
of organs of this type should not be carried out until there has been a resolution of
these immunological problems. Similarly, many of the basic biologists feel that the
cost and effort currently expended for clinical transplantation might be more profit-
ably utilized in studies of the basic biological mechanisms. As a result, each year,
international conferences are being held in order to reevaluate mechanisms which pro-
duce the immune responses.
It would appear that there is a possibility of inducing tolerance between indi-
viduals, this tolerance being determined by various properties of the antigen concerned
and by the dose in which it is administered. Scientists are optimistic that the proper
use of antigens can induce specific tolerance in adult animals, but formal proof of
this proposition remains as illusive as ever. Natural tolerance is a phenomenon of
intrauterine development of the embryo; acquired tolerance in the adult is still an
unattainable goal except under very specific and impractical laboratory circumstances.
With the advent of anti-lymphocyte serum and more specifically of anti-lymphocyte
globulin, it was hoped that one could achieve a specific destruction of the lymphocytes
and/or macrophages involved in the immunological response and thereby obtain pro-
longed tolerance of homographs. Unfortunately, it would appear that although anti-
lymphocyte globulin is a desirable adjunct to organ homotransplantation, it does not
solve the problem; its prolonged use results in an anti-anti-lymphocyte serum. Further-
more, it would appear that the response engendered by a prolonged use of anti-
lymphocyte serum is nonspecific, since certain normal mechanisms of immunological
surveillance cease functioning. This permits the recipient of an anti-lymphocyte
serum to develop cancers of the lymphoreticular tissues in an unwelcome but definite
percentage of cases.
The discovery of new drugs which will selectively suppress the immune rejection
transplantation has not occurred. Immuran, which was discovered a number of years
November 19691
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At present there have been less than 2,000 kidney transplants
completed around the world,18 including kidney transplants of live
donor kidneys from a relative or friend and of cadaver kidneys." The
results from kidney transplants are far better if one can obtain a live,
related donor with appropriate tissue typing, so that the donor and the
recipient match in their tissue types to a maximal degree. 20  A transplant
registry has been established, where virtually all transplants are listed
by results and individual groups.2' Of the patients receiving trans-
ago, remains the drug par excellence in the treatment of the immune rejection phe-
nomena. Nevertheless, the ability to accurately suppress specific immune responses and
thereby permit homograph transplantation seems to all an ultimately soluble problem.
Transplantation of organs would then become a frequent yet expensive medical practice.
See generally Murray, Wilson, Tilney, Merrill, Cooper, Birtch, Carpenter, Hazer, Dam-
min & Harrison, Five Years' Experience in Renal Transplantation with Immuno-
suppressive Drugs, 168 ANNALS OF SURGERY 416 (1968).
18. Cardiac Transplantation 2490.
19. "According to the most recent tabulations of the Registry of Human Kidney
Transplants reporting on 627 kidney homotransplants, the proportion of donors in
human kidney homografts has been as follows: Parents, 28.2%; siblings, 16.3%; other
blood relatives, 1.9%; unrelated live donors, 15.2%; and cadavers, 38.4%." Couch,
Supply and Demand in Kidney and Liver Transplantation: A Statistical Survey, 4
TRANSPLANTATON 587, 590 (1966).
20. Hume, Lee, Williams, White, Ferr6, Wolf, Prout, Slapak, O'Brien, Kilpatrick,
Kauffman & Cleveland, Comparative Results of Cadaver and Related Donor Renal
Homographs in Man, and Immunologic Implications of the Outcome of Second and
Paired Transplants, 164 ANNALS OF SURGERY 352 (1966).
The results from transplantations, together with experimental work on human
tissues, persuasively suggest that the number of strong antigens involved in the rejection
of homographs in man is rather limited, and that this limited number of strong
antigens can be readily detected by present serologic techniques. In fact, many groups
around the world are currently working with white cell (lymphocyte) and tissue typing;
it would appear that the success of transplantation of organs is closely correlated
with an accurate matching of the histo-compatibility antigens which can be determined
by lymphocyte and tissue typing.
Everyone is familiar with the grouping of blood into A, B, & 0 groups, with cross
matching between groups dependent on various factors, including the RH factor. In
tissue typing, serologic methods for classifying the tissues can be compared with blood-
type grouping, and various new tests involving specific reactions of lymphocytes can be
related to cross-matching. The clinical work with kidney transplants clearly shows that
sibling donors, although not as satisfactory as monozygotic twins, are more successful
than distantly related donors, and these in turn are far more successful than grafting
between unrelated donors. With the unlikelihood of sufficient donor organs being
available from related donors, the importance of typing and matching to allogeneic
transplants becomes immediately apparent.
The long term success rate of homographs is clearly related to proper matches
between tissue types at the transplantation locus. Scientists are optimistic about the
prospects for a form of typing or cross matching, and with continued progress successful
allogeneic transplantation of organs should be possible within the next three to ten
years. See generally id.
21. See note 20 supra.
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plants from related living donors, 60 percent have survived over the
past four years.22 In some clinics, there is an 80 percent survival figure
for the last three years.23 Even with our currently imperfect methods,
the five year survival rate for kidney transplants is better than the five
year survival rate of the majority of patients treated for various can-
cers.24  The closer the genetic match between donor and recipient,
the greater the likelihood of survival of a renal transplant and the more
permanent the function of the transplanted kidney with respect to the
passage of time.25 The "perfect" transplant, therefore, is the syngenetic
transplant between identical twins, because of the genetic identity be-
tween the donor and the recipient.2 6
The success rate from cadaver donors has not been as high as
that from live donors. The survival rate for those patients who re-
ceived kidneys from c6daver donors more than four years ago is 30 per-
cent while 60 percent of such recipients who underwent renal trans-
plantation one to three years ago continue to survive.27 Nevertheless,
pathological studies have shown that all homografts are undergoing a
slow rejection.28
Nearly all transplanted kidneys will fail through rejection unless
immunosuppressive agents are administered on a continuing basis.29
The degree of immunosuppression required depends upon the antigenic
diversity between the donor and recipient, so that minimal immuno-
suppression is required when the donor and recipient are closely
matched with respect to their tissue typing antigens.30 The dosage of
the immunosuppressive drugs required is important because such drugs
suppress all immune response of the transplant recipient and may cause
deleterious side effects.3 1
22. Cardiac Transplantation 2490.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. See note 19 supra.
26. Cardiac Transplantation 2490.
27. Id.
28. Cardiac Transplantation 2490.
29. See Hamburger, A Reappraisal of the Concept of Organ "Rejection," Based
on the Study of Homotransplanted Kidneys, 5 TRANSPLANTATiON 870 (1967); Murray,
Wilson, Tilney, Merrill, Cooper, Birch, Carpenter, Hager, Dammin & Harrison, Five
Years' Experience in Renal Transplantation with Immunosuppressive Drugs: Survival,
Function, Complications and the Role of Lymphocyte Depletion by Thoracic Duct
Fistula, 168 ANNALS OF SURGERY 416, 421 (1968).
30. The H.L.S. system is the antigenic system most closely related to tissue and
organ transplantation. For a good discussion see Cardiac Transplantation 2490-91.
31. The deleterious side effects of the immunosuppressive agents (Immuran,
Corticords, Actinomycin and X-Ray) include suppression of growth of young children,
November 19691 TRANSPLANTATION
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The increased likelihood of success of the transplantation of a kid-
ney from one live human being to another, particularly evident if
there is a genetic relationship between donor and recipient, is a prime
factor in favor of such a graft. However, there are problems attend-
ing a transplant from a live donor. Being asked to donate a kidney
places the potential donor under psychological stress. Also, the donor
is subjected to definite medical risks. Although no live donor has thus
far succumbed to such an operation, the risk remains that ultimately
such a death will occur. Furthermore, the donor is left with only
one kidney. The effect of the removal of one kidney on the longevity
of the donor, and the increased risk of renal failure in the remaining
kidney has not been established. The propriety of subjecting a donor
to such risks has been established largely by common usage; but
optimistically, doctors would prefer to perfect artificial kidneys or to
use cadaver kidneys in an effort to avoid these complex psychological
and medical problems.
A. Problems Inherent in Kidney Transplantation
1. Donation of Kidneys
At the present time the law permits an adult, informed of the risks
and consequences, to donate a kidney.32 There is some question, how-
ever, whether the donor is acting free of coercive forces. The donor is
subjected to extreme psychological and emotional pressures inherent in
his opportunity to save the life of a friend or relative; but despite the
existence of such moral pressures, practice has established the fact that
a fully informed adult is sufficiently free of coercion to give valid con-
sent.33
The problem becomes more complex when one deals with donation
of a kidney from a minor, since the minor, of course, is incapable of
consent. 34  The parent can consent to the operation on a minor, even
though it certainly would not be for the benefit of the donor child; but
because of the potential liability involved in such an operation, most
surgeons refuse to take an organ from a minor without a court order.
reduction in the ability of the body to defend itself against bacterial, viral and fungus
infections, suppression of the bone marrow, skeletal lesions with softening of the bones,
hypertension or high blood pressure, and other undesirable metabolic consequences.
32. Louisell, Transplantation: Existing Legal Constraints, in ETics IN MEDICAL
PROGRESS 78, 80-86 (1966).
33. Beecher, Some Fallacies and Errors in the Application of the Principle of
Consent in Human Experimentation, 3 CLINICAL PHARMACOLOGY & THERAPEUTICS
141 (1962).
34. E.g., Bonner v. Moran, 126 F.2d 121 (D.C. Cir. 1941).
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On three occasions, Massachusetts courts have authorized the re-
moval of a kidney from a minor to be transplanted to his identical
twin,8 which is the optimum situation for renal transplantation. Al-
though the minors were 19, 14 and 14 years of age respectively, the
donors, their parents, and the surgeons had all consented to the oper-
ation. In rendering the decision, the court found in each case that the
healthy twin fully understood the nature of the operation and its possible
consequences."6 The court also determined that the healthy twin would
benefit from the transplantation in that performance of the operation
would avoid the suffering and profound emotional distress which the
potential donor would suffer knowing the transplantation would have
saved the life of his twinY'
2. Sale of Kidneys
The question has also arisen concerning the sale of organs for
renal transplantation. At the present time, of course, many indi-
viduals sell their blood to the blood bank; but the risk of selling one
kidney far surpasses the risk of contributing a pint of blood to the blood
bank. The general feeling at the present is that the sale of organs
should not be permitted.38 The principles of medical risk and psycho-
logical stress would not apply to the donation of cadaver organs or to
their sale; but thus far the sale of cadaver organs has not occurred.
3. Selection of Individual to Receive Treatment
In order to preserve the life of an individual suffering renal fail-
ure, to perform transplantation successfully, and to care for the patient
through potential crises until survival of the transplant occurs, adjunct
hemodialysis facilities are essential. 9 While artificial kidney centers
35. The cases, not printed in the official reports, are discussed in Curran, A
Problem of Consent: Kidney Transplantation in Minors, 34 N.Y.U.L. REv. 891
(1959).
36. id. at 893-95.
37. Id.
38. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 24, § 1780(b) (Supp. 1968).
39. Hemodialysis is the filtration of the blood by circulation through an external
artificial kidney. The technique of hemodialysis had been greatly simplified in recent
years with the development of arterial-venous shunts which the patient can wear
permanently. These shunts consist of a small piece of teflon which can be inserted
into an artery of the body such as the radial artery, make a U-turn and empty back
into a forearm vein such as the cephalic vein, and there stay permanently open. It is
possible to connect the external shunt to an artificial kidney and to perform hemo-
dialysis on a daily or twice weekly basis if needed, and then disconnect the patient
from the hemodialysis machinery, reestablish the shunt and permit him to go about
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THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL
established around the world have made hemodialysis more available
and have helped to reduce the cost of treatment, one center with
maximum efficiency and optimum personnel can only care for ten to
thirty patients per year. A prolonged favorable outcome from chronic
human dialysis requires meticulous attention to detail in both the med-
ical and paramedical aspects of total patient care. Chronic hemodialysis
suboptimally done is not in the patient's interest and generally results in
an incapacitating life or death.
The limited facilities available raise the very complex question:
Who gets the available kidney, whether artificial or transplanted? Pa-
tient selection becomes one of the crucial problems in organ trans-
plantation. The current answer to the question is determined by a med-
ical evaluation, a psychiatric evaluation, a sociological evaluation and
an evaluation of the recipient's potential contribution to society. The
medical evaluation centers on the health and age of the patient. Gen-
erally, the healthier the patient, the more suitable he is for hemodialysis.
Most patients over 50 years of age or under 13 years of age are re-
jected for chronic hemodialysis but they certainly could be considered
for renal transplantation.
Because treatment is long, protracted and difficult, the psychiatric
evaluation of the patient hinges on his intelligence, his ability to take
care of his health once treatment with the artificial kidney or trans-
plantation has occurred, and his ability to tolerate complications, de-
pression, and discouragement. The patient must have the ability to
live in an insecure and uncertain environment, for once renal failure has
occurred, his future health is always in jeopardy.
Even more difficult is the evaluation of the social worth of the
patient and his potential contribution to society at large following suc-
cessful treatment of the renal failure. Indeed, it is questionable if social
worth evaluations should be made at all.
The selection of patients for hemodialysis or transplantation re-
quires equal and just treatment for all. Once it has been decided that
normal activities. The artificial kidney does the work of a normal kidney by removing
blood waste products such as urea and creatinine, regulating the salt and water balance
of the patient, and ridding the body of the excess fluid.
Hemodialysis has been developed now to where it can occur in the patient's home
as well as in the hospital. Home dialysis requires the patient and his family to assume
the obligations of proper control of the dialysis unit, including control of the blood
electrolytes in the patient, his blood volume and his general well-being. Not everyone
would submit to home dialysis, but it is far less expensive than hospital dialysis
($5,000 to $7,000 per year for home dialysis as opposed to $10,000 to $15,000 per
year for dialysis at an artificial kidney center).
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the patient is a good medical risk for dialysis or transplantation, the
choice would then have to be made on judgments other than individual
or social worth. Possible methods would include: (1) first come,
first served; (2) lottery or random selection; (3) rules announced in
advance that are constitutionally just and nondiscriminatory; and (4)
the patient's ability to pay.4" The method used should be determined
by federal statute to insure uniform standards throughout the country.
The problems involved in the treatment of renal failure, either by
chronic hemodialysis or by transplantation, continue to pose problems
which we are still unprepared to answer. As one writer explains:
Scientific technology and medical research have ushered us precip-
itately [sic] into a civilization for which our legal institutions are
not yet prepared. We are entering an era in which power is based
not on conventional forms of property, but on technical knowledge
and intellectual skills. The ancient dream of a physician-to have
his patients die young and as late as possible--may be realized
through the application of medical technology. But medical tech-
nology is power, and the supervision of power is, in our civilization,
the first function of law. If history is a guide, many problems
incubated in hospitals will occur in our courts.
41
11. Cardiac Transplantation
The technical aspects of transplantation of the entire heart were
worked out in experimental surgical laboratories in the late 1950's. The
first successful human heart transplantation was accomplished in De-
cember of 1967.42 The goal of cardiac transplantation is the long-term
restoration of a critically ill patient to a productive and personally en-
joyable life.
At the present time in America there are approximately 200,000
deaths each year from acquired or congenital heart disease in the 15 to
64 age group.43 Nearly 160,000 of these deaths are the result of
coronary heart disease.44 80,000 such deaths occur before the patient
reaches the hospital.45  Among the 80,000 who survive coronary heart
disease long enough to be hospitalized, it is estimated that as few as
10,000 or as many as 50,000 may require total cardiac replacement. 0
Mechanical hearts, comparable to artificial kidneys, are just be-
40. Sanders & Dukeminier, Medical Advance and Legal Lag: Hemodialysis
and Kidney Transplantation, 15 U.C.L.A.L. REv. 357, 380 (1968).
41. Id. at 386.
42. TIME, Dec. 15, 1967, at 64.





ginning to emerge and currently are limited by technological develop-
ments, power source problems, and hemolytic difficulties with the
pumped blood. In our present state of knowledge, then, transplantation
of the heart is the more practical long-term alternative for the care of
these 50,000 patients. This assumes, of course, that cardiac transplan-
tation has the likelihood of long-term success equal and comparable to
that existing now for renal transplantation.
As of October 1968, approximately 66 human heart transplants had
been carried out, and in more than 90 percent of these, immediate suc-
cessful function of the heart has occurred." Unfortunately, the goal of
full restoration to a useful and satisfactory life has been achieved in
only one or two patients in this entire group. Indeed, the first success-
ful patient to receive another person's heart is the only person to sur-
vive cardiac transplantation beyond one year." A report in October
of 1968 showed that only 31 of the original group of 66 transplants
were still living, and only 2 of these had survived longer than 6
months. 49  The feasibility and validity of cardiac transplantation has
been demonstrated; but the immunological rejection phenomena still
militates against long term survival of the transplanted heart. Never-
theless, several important factors have emerged. Optimally, the donor
organ should be promptly removed while it is still viable, beating and
contracting; the recipient should be undergoing operative removal of his
own heart simultaneously; and the period of transient50 should be held
to a minimum. The period of transient for a successful heart transplant
varies between 45 and 60 minutes. After 60 minutes, damage to the
donor heart occurs from ischemic arrest.5  What is badly needed, of
course, is a technique for cardiac preservation so that more time can
elapse between removal of the donor heart and its insertion into the
recipient.
A. The Source of Hearts for Transplantation
National surveys have indicated that 70 percent of the population
47. Id. at 2493.
48. The recipient of the third human heart transplant and the first successful
cardiac transplant, Dr. Philip Blaiberg, died August 18, 1969, approximately 18 months
after receiving the transplanted heart. TIME, Aug. 29, 1969, at 34.
49. Haller & Cerruti, Heart Transplantation in Man: Compilation of Cases, 22
AM. J. CARDIOLOGY 840, 841-43 (1968).
50. The period of transient, during which the heart is removed from the donor
before it is successfully transplanted into the recipient, is known as ischemia. 1
ScHMmT's ATTORNEY'S DICTIONARY OF MEDICINE 485 (1969).
51. Cardiac Transplantation 2493.
THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 21
may be willing to donate their bodies for medical research or therapy;
52
the total pool of donors, however, must be limited to those dying be-
tween the ages of 15 and 64 of causes other than heart disease or can-
cer. The total pool of donors in the United States then diminishes to
260,000 people per year53 and this group includes those who die of
infections, blood disorders, and degenerative diseases, not all of whom
would be suitable donors for heart transplantation. Matching the pool
of willing donors to a possible 50,000 recipients54 would be further
complicated by the need for proper tissue typing and matching between
donor and recipient, and the problem of organ preservation, and trans-
portation of either the donor or the recipient to a location suitable
for successful transplantation.
Particular care should be given to the threatened rejection of the
transplanted heart. Patients receiving the heart of another are given
immunosuppressive drugs"5 and seem to be particularly prone to bac-
terial infections during the post-transplant period. It appears that it is
more important to isolate these patients for longer periods of time than
is necessary for kidney patients. The recipient should be essentially well
and normal except for the damaged heart, and the prospective donor
should have been young, vigorous, and optimally, have died from
irreversible and irreparable brain damage with normal cardiac function
up to the time the heart is removed. 56
Mechanical devices are helpful for preservation of both donor
and recipient in a heart transplantation. At this time the artificial heart
and related cardiac assistance devices do not compete with but com-
plement cardiac transplantations. It is very likely that in the future
artificial or mechanical hearts may be employed for long-term partial
or total cardiac substitution.T
B. Professional Response to the Moral and Ethical Issues
in Cardiac Transplantation
The present results of cardiac transplantation raise the serious
moral and ethical problem of whether human heart transplantation
52. Id. at 2494.
53. Id. at 2497.
54. Id. at 2498.
55. The immunosuppressive agents include: Immuran, steroids and anti-lyph-
ocyte globulin.
56. Up to the present time the majority of donors for heart transplantation has
come from victims of trauma or spontaneous brain hemorrhage. On a national basis
it is estimated that there are about 60,000 such victims annually in the United States.
Cardiac Transplantation 2498.
57. Id. at 2494.
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should be continued in the absence of a complete resolution of the
problem of immunological rejection of foreign tissue. Such consider-
ations have produced a statement by the House of Delegates of the
American Medical Association addressed to the continuing debate
within the medical profession, the public press and legislative councils
on the problem of heart transplantation.58 It focuses on the physician's
responsibility in the determination of death, the protocols for clinical
investigation and the direction of medical research in heart transplan-
tation. It offers the following guidelines: (1) Cardiac transplantation
should be done only in special centers in which adequate backgrounds
in animal research exist, in which experience with immunosuppressive
therapy including anti-lymphocyte globulin has been accumulated, and
in which protocol for clinical research is adequate to follow and evalu-
ate the patients, so that records may be accurately evaluated on a na-
tional basis. (2) Due regard must be maintained for the welfare
and safety of each individual patient undergoing cardiac transplantation.
(3) The cause of the donor's death must be evident and of an irre-
versible type. In the opinion of the physicians making the determina-
tion, the fact of death must be established by current and acceptable
scientific evidence. The determination of death of the donor must be
made by no less than two physicians not associated with the surgical
team performing the cardiac transplantation. (4) An attempt should
be made to overcome the disparity between the need and supply in
organ transplantation by adoption of the Uniform Anatomical Gift
Act or similar laws. Cooperative donor organ programs should be es-
tablished. (5) While the use of public news media for self-seeking
purposes by any physician is unethical, the public communications
media must be wisely used to gain public support. (6) The public must
be fully aware of the potentialities and limitations of heart transplan-
tation and fully aware of the protocols being used in the clinical investi-
gations being undertaken. 59
58. Panel of the American Medical Association, Statement on Heart Trans-
plantation, 207 J.A.M.A. 1704 (1969).
59. Id. at 1704-06. A similar proposal appeared in Cardiac Transplantation
at 2499:
V. Recommendations
V, 1.-Cardiac transplantation, still in an early stage of development, shows
promise for the future treatment of many people with severe heart disease; it should
be conducted by surgeons with proven capability in cardiac surgery, physicians ex-
perienced in all phases of cardiology, and with the collaboration of persons ex-
perienced in immunosuppression and transplant biology.
V, 2.-The need for new knowledge from basic and applied research for the
continued improvement of all transplantation is emphasized.
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Many legal problems arise from the recent progress in the field of
organ transplantation. Among the more difficult problems are: (1)
Can the living person bequeath his organs or his body to medical
authorities for their use? (2) Must the next of kin consent to the re-
moval of organs from a cadaver? (3) Is death defined in terms of
an organ or a body? (4) When is a person dead? (5) Can a live
organ be removed from a dead patient? (6) How shall organs be
allocated, or who gets the necessary transplanted organ? (7) Can
organs be removed from traumatic cases pronounced dead, prior to a
coroner's autopsy? Resolution of these problems must be accomplished
in the near future, since the medical barriers to successful transplantation
are yielding rapidly to scientific progress.
There are three broad concepts on which legal proposals should
be based: First, live or potentially viable organs from dead patients or
cadavers should be available to potential recipients. No longer needed
V, 3.-A national transplant registry, utilizing the experience of the present
Kidney Transplant Registry, should be established. The organization assuming this
responsibility might make computer-processed data on all clinical transplantation of all
vascularized organs available.
V, 4.-The costs of patient care are very great and generally cannot be borne by
patients or their families. New sources of support must be mobilized-individual, local,
and federal. Private and public insurance must be coordinated. Support for patient
care can appropriately be home by research grants only when the research itself is
productive.
V, 5.-A regional type of organization is recommended both for the referral and
management of patients, and for the procurement, preservation, and distribution of
scarce anatomical resources. There should be interregional coordination.
V, 6.-The Uniform Anatomical Gift Act, prepared by the National Conference
of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, has been endorsed by the American Bar
Association. It is essential that all appropriate medical and legal groups work together
to support the adoption of the Uniform Act in every state.
V, 7.-The Regional Medical Programs of the Department of Health, Education,
and Welfare should provide an ideal new source for the financial support of patient care,
clinical research, regional organ procurement, preservation, and distribution.
V, 8.-The basic science background of transplant science has been supported
by the National Science Foundation, National Institutes of Health, and private foun-
dations as well as, to a lesser extent, other governmental agencies including the Army,
Navy, and National Aeronautics and Space Administration. Basic science lies very
close to clinical application in the transplant field; basic advances (anti-lymphocyte
serum, for example) may reach clinical application very rapidly. If current cutbacks
in support of research continue, a severe slowdown in the increasing safety and
applicability of cardiac transplantation will soon become evident. Proper federal
support must be restored to these agencies, particularly the National Science Founda-
tion and the National Institutes of Health.
V, 9.-A new pattern for a commission or agency on health service and science
is recommended to protect and to maintain the national effort in biomedical sciences.
This agency should maintain appropriate emphasis and priorities for all important
fields, such as tissue transplantation.
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by the decedent, such organs could enable another to enjoy continued
life. Second, there should be access for all to the tools, techniques,
and advantages of current knowledge and capabilities in organ trans-
plantation, and to the available organs themselves. Third, the central
social, moral, and ethical principle is the preservation of life.
In pursuing these broad legal guidelines, the bodily integrity of the
living should be preserved. The desires of the decedent, with respect
to the disposition of his body, should be honored and the interest of the
bereaved survivors should yield to his request. If the decedent has not
stated his desires with respect to disposition of his body, his next of kin
should have the option of donating his organs. In this way their trauma
would be minimized by providing rather than denying life to a recipient.
III. The Uniform Anatomical Gift Act
A. Background of the Act
English common law entitled a person's heirs to possession of the
body in the same condition in which it was at the time of death. This
right developed to enable the heirs to provide for the burial of the
decedent. 60 However, the heirs did not have "property rights" in the
dead body,61 because a corpse was viewed as something incapable of
being owned. It was not part of the decedent's estate and thus owner-
ship did not descend to his heirs.62
Early law in the United States followed this common law view;6s
but more recent authority recognizes that an individual has sufficient
interest in his own body to enable him to direct its postmortem dispo-
sition.
6 4
In nearly all states, the common law right of the next of kin to per-
mit an autopsy on the deceased has been codified in autopsy stat-
utes.6 5 Such statutes, however, generally are not broad enough to
60. Note, Donations of Dead Bodies and Parts Thereof for Medical Use, 21 U.
Prrr. L. REv. 523, 528 (1960).
61. E.g., Regina v. Sharpe, 169 Eng. Rep. 959 (Ct. Crim. App. 1857).
62. See Finley v. Atlantic Transp. Co., 220 N.Y. 249, 115 N.E. 715 (1917);
Williams v. Williams, 20 Ch. D. 659 (1882). The court in Meagher v. Driscoll, 99
Mass. 281 (1868), stated: "By the common law, 'though the heir has a property in
the monuments and escutcheons, yet he has none in their bodies or ashes......
Id. at 284, quoting 2 BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES* 429.
63. E.g., Enos v. Snyder, 131 Cal. 68, 63 P. 170 (1900).
64. See In re Henderson's Estate, 13 Cal. App. 2d 449, 57 P.2d 212 (1936);
Holland v. Metalious, 105 N.H. 290, 198 A.2d 654 (1964); In re Johnson's Estate,
169 Misc. 215, 7 N.Y.S.2d 81 (Sur. Ct. 1938); CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 7100.
65. E.g., CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 7113; HAWAII REV. STATS. § 453-15
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allow the next of kin to donate the decedent's organs or tissue for re-
search or transplantation. Such donations are beyond the scope of an
autopsy.06
Similarly, most states provide for the delivery of unclaimed bodies
to medical schools for dissection; 67 yet, since such statutes contain mini-
mum waiting periods, during which the hospital must make a reason-
able search for the individual's next of kin,6" the organs of "unclaimed
bodies" are not available for transplantation.69
In practically all states, the rights of the next of kin are supplanted
by the authority of the coroner or medical examiner to perform an
autopsy and determine the cause of death in violent or suspicious circum-
stances, or if the deceased was not attended by a physician within a
fixed period before the time of death.70 Coroners and medical exam-
iners, however, are usually limited to determining the cause of death;
they cannot remove organs or tissue for other purposes without the
consent of the next of kin.7
A recent Virginia statute72 directly confers upon the Chief Med-
ical Examiner or his deputies the power to make organs, needed for
transplantation, available if there is insufficient time to obtain per-
mission from the next of kin. Since the heart must be transplanted
immediately and the kidney removed from the deceased within one
hour after death, such a statute would enable the authorized official
to exercise his power in a great number of cases.
A Hawaiian statute7s gives the coroner's physician or a medical
(1968); IOWA CODE ANN. § 141.35 (Supp. 1969); N.Y. PuB. HEALTH LAW § 4210
(McKinney 1954).
66. "Autopsy" is defined as the dissection of a body for the purpose of inquiring
into the cause of death. BLACK's LAW DicnoNARY 170 (4th ed. 1951).
67. E.g., CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 7203; KANs. STATs. ANN. § 65-901
(1964); N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 4211 (McKinney 1954); Wis. STATs. ANN. § 155.02
(1957).
68. E.g., CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 7202; KANs. STATS. ANN. § 65-902
(1964); N.Y. PuB. HEALTH LAw § 4211 (McKinney 1954); Wis. STATS. ANN. §
155.02 (1957).
69. Such organs must be removed when they are living or viable. The long
period of waiting destroys the organ's usefulness. See text accompanying notes 49-50
supra.
70. E.g., CAL. GOV'T CODE § 27491; ILL. ANN. STATS. ch. 19, § 10.2 (Smith-
Hurd 1969); MINN. STATS. ANN. § 390.11 (1968).
71. See, e.g., Bonilla v. Reeves, 49 Misc. 2d 273, 275-76, 267 N.Y.S.2d 374,
377-78 (1966); CAL. GOV'T CODE § 27491.4: "[The coroner] shall have the right to
retain such tissues of the body removed at the time of the autopsy as may, in his
opinion, be necessary... to the inquiry into the case ....
72. See note 10 supra.
73. HAwAII REv. STATS. § 715-14 (1968).
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examiner the authority to retain tissues removed during the course of an
autopsy. This tissue is to be used for scientific investigation,7 4 an area
which includes transplantation.
Similarly, section 7115 of the California Health and Safety Code
provided that those who were authorized to grant an autopsy could
authorize the removal of tissue for transplantation. When this section
was read with California Health and Safety Code section 7113, it ap-
peared to give to the coroner the authority to take tissue for transplan-
tation.75 Apparently this did not meet with the approval of the Cali-
fornia legislature, for the section has recently been repealed. 76
With the rapid development of medical science in the field of
transplantation, all but two states77 have enacted statutes containing
specific provisions for the antemortum donation of all or part of the
body.78 Even in the states with specific provisions, however, donation
statutes are not sufficiently clear to avoid the many uncertainties of the
common law and to permit, freely and easily, the donation of organs.
The need for ideal donation statutes became obvious in the early 1960's.
It was apparent that the individual should have the power to donate
organs prior to death, that the next of kin should have the authority to
donate, and that conflicts between the donor and the next of kin must be
avoided. The purposes for which the donation of organs could be
made must be clearly stated and the mechanism of the donation should
be by will, gift, cards, or other written documents. With the in-
creased public awareness of the need for laws relating to transplantation
of organs and procurement of tissues from cadavers, and with the need
to protect doctors engaging in transplantation, legal activity quickened
and uniformity in state laws became essential.
The Commissioners on Uniform State Laws met in a national
conference in August, 1967, and by July, 1968, the Uniform Anatomical
Gift Act was drawn up and approved. The act has been approved by
the American Bar Association and the Medical-Legal Liaison Committee
of the American Medical Association. A copy of the Uniform Anatom-
ical Gift Act is appended.7 9
74. Id.
75. This fact was first noted in Sadler & Sadler, Transplantation and the Law:
The Need for Organized Sensitivity, 57 GEO. L.J. 5, 16 (1968).
76. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 7115 was added by Cal. Stats. 1957, ch. 933,
§ 2, at 2145. It was repealed by Cal. Stats. 1968, ch. 926, at 1759.
77. The two states are New Hampshire and Utah. See Appendix A.
78. See Appendix B.
79. See Appendix C.
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B. The Act Itself
The Uniform Anatomical Gift Act is designed to facilitate the do-
nation of human tissues and organs for transplantation through the es-
tablishment of a favorable legal environment for such scientific ac-
tivities. Organs can be procured from either living or dead donors.
The informed consent of the living donor, however, is implicit in the
donation of an organ. If the donation of an organ occurs after death of
the donor, the law has been drafted to recognize: (1) The wishes of
the deceased; (2) the wishes of the surviving spouse or next of kin;
(3) the need for organs and tissues for maintaining life in suitable
recipients, and (4) the need for establishing the cause of death and
time of death under specific circumstances which would facilitate do-
nation of organs.
The Uniform Anatomical Gift Act makes an effort to provide com-
mon national laws governing thirteen essential points involved in the
donation of organs, serving as an excellent model for uniform state
legislation. The important provisions of the Uniform Anatomical Gift
Act are developed below.
1. Individual Authority to Donate
The Act specifically provides that "[a]ny individual of sound
mind and 18 years of age or more may give all or any part of his body
for any purposes specified in Section 3, the gift to take effect upon
death."80 This antemortem donation authority, not found in the com-
mon law, is the core of the donation statute.81 The proposed age
limit would provide a uniform standard rather than the great diversity
found in present state statutes.82
2. Next of Kin Authority to Donate
The right of next of kin to donate all or part of the deceased's body
is explicitly stated 3 and a definite priority among those individuals
comprising the next of kin is provided. 84 This places the authority to
donate in the hands of the individual most properly concerned and pro-
80. UNFORm ANATOzMICAL GiFr Acr § 2(a) [hereinafter referred to as GUr
AcTI.
81. AD Hoe COMM Ee ON MEDICAL-LEGAL PROBLEMS, A REPORT TO TEM
COMMITT ON TISSUE TRANSPLANTATION 5 (Division of Medical Sciences, National
Research Council, June 6, 1968).
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vides a natural progression of the power to insure that doctors will
have a source of permission for the transplantation of a needed organ.
This provision is a major improvement over existing statutes since ade-
quate next of kin provisions appear in only 13 state statutes. s5
3. Possible Conflict Between Donor and Next of Kin
The Uniform Act provides that the donation by the deceased is
paramount to the wishes of the next of kin, and conflicts between next
of kin are resolved by classification of priorities, the foremost of which
belongs to the surviving spouse, if there be one.86  The existing
statutes in a few jurisdictions provide for such conflicts.8 7  The lan-
guage of the Uniform Act is clear, thus avoiding possible controversy
and resulting uncertainty in the minds of attending physicians.
4(a). Possible Donees
The Uniform Act expressly lists persons who may become donees.
Permissible donees under the Act include tissue banks, specified persons,
hospitals and accredited medical and dental schools,8 while existing
state statutes demonstrate considerable diversity concerning possible
donees8 9 Such conflicts of law should be avoided.
4(b). Obligations of the Donee
The Uniform Act provides:
The donee may accept or reject the gift. If the donee accepts a gift
of the entire body, he may, subject to the terms of the gift, authorize
embalming and the use of the body in funeral services. If the gift
is of a part of the body, the donee, upon the death of the donor and
prior to embalming, shall cause the part to be removed without un-
necessary mutilation. After removal of the part, custody of the
remainder of the body vests in the surviving spouse, next of kin or
other persons under obligation to dispose of the body.90
85. These states are California, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Maryland,
Nebraska, Nevada, New Jersey, Oregon, Rhode Island, Virginia, and Washington. The
District of Columbia also provides an order of priority. See Appendix B. This list
does not include those states which have adopted the GIFT ACT. See note 104 infra.
86. GiFT ACT § 2(b).
87. Those states are Alabama, Alaska (eyes only), Arkansas, California, Connect-
icut, Florida, Hawaii, Mississippi, Missouri, Nebraska, Nevada, New Jersey, Ohio,
Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Tennessee, Washington, and Wisconsin. See
Appendix B. This list does not include those states which have adopted the GIFr AcT.
See note 104 infra.
88. GIFT ACT § 3.
89. See Appendix B.
90. GiFr ACT § 7(a).
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While it is generally acknowledged that the named donee should be
under no obligation to accept a gift, the statutes in most states are silent
on this point."
5. Purposes for Which Donations Can Be Made
Section 3 of the Act provides the purposes for which gifts can
be used. The purposes include medical or dental education, research,
advancement of medical and dental science, therapy and transplan-
tation.9" It is interesting to note that in this regard, the Uniform Act
is not as permissive as the existing statutes in several states; 93 under the
Connecticut statute, the donation of any structure or organ can be made
for therapeutic or scientific uses."
6. Mechanisms of Gift
The gift may be made by will, and such gift is effective immediately
upon death without waiting for probate. 5 If there is no will, any
written instrument is valid if witnessed by two persons.98 To aid rapid
identification of a potential donor, the Uniform Act provides that a prop-
erly executed card, carried on the person, is a suitable legal document
for donation of organs under appropriate circumstances.97 Finally,
recorded telephonic or telegraphic consent by the properly authorized
next of kin is legally acceptable under the Act.
98
7. Revocation or Amendment of Gift
The donor may amend or revoke the gift of an organ at any time
up to his death by one of six methods, including an oral statement
witnessed by two persons.99 Adequate provisions for amending or re-
voking such gifts are lacking in most state statutes.100
91. States which mention this are Hawaii, Maryland, and Wisconsin. See
Appendix B.
92. GTrAcT § 3.
93. See, e.g., California, Connecticut, Indiana, Iowa. Appendix B.
94. CONN. GEN. STATS. ANN. § 19-1396 (Supp. 1969).
95. Gnir AcT § 4(a).
96. GuwT Acr § 4(b).
97. Id.
98. Gn=r AT § 4(e).
99. Gw AcT § 6.
100. Only Kansas and Maryland provide sufficient language. See Appendix .
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8. Protection from Liability for Physicians and Others Acting in
Accordance with the Statute
The Act provides that "[a] person who acts in good faith in accord
with the terms of this Act, or under the anatomical gift laws of another
state [or a foreign country] is not liable for damages in any civil action
or subject to prosecution in any criminal proceeding for his act." ''
Thus protection is extended beyond the physician to all who act in ac-
cordance with the statute.
9. Conflicts of Laws
Since state statutes vary greatly, conflicts of laws are very likely; but
under the Uniform Act, in the event of a conflict of interest between
current state laws, the physician is protected from liability if he acts in
good faith and in accordance with the terms of either of the state laws. 102
10. Time of Death
The Uniform Act does not attempt to state a definition of death.
It merely states that: "[t]he time of death shall be determined by a
physician who attends the donor at his death, or, if none, the physician
who certifies the death. This physician shall not participate in the pro-
cedures for removing or transplanting a part."'0 3  The definition of
death will be discussed in more detail below.
The Uniform Anatomical Gift Act certainly provides a desirable
model for reform of present statutes relating to the donation of organs
for transplantation or other medical purposes. Each state will have
to consider the Act in legislative sessions and decide whether or not to
adopt it.104 Adoption of the Uniform Anatomical Gift Act by all state
legislatures would be beneficial to both lawyers and physicians, as
well as the general public, in making possible progress in organ trans-
plantation. The Act is consistent and favorable; it is morally and
ethically sound and affords the mechanism for transplantation of or-
gans with suitable protection from criminal or civil suits to all parties in-
volved.
There are, however, two serious defects in the Act. First, the Act
still requires for gift of the organ informed consent either by the live
101. GIFT ACT § 7(c).
102. Id.
103. GiFT ACT § 7(b).
104. The Uniform Anatomical Gift Act has recently been adopted, with few
changes, in the following states: Idaho, Louisiana, Montana, New Mexico, North
Dakota, Oklahoma, South Dakota, Vermont, and Wyoming. See Appendix B.
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patient or by the next of kin. This is too restrictive a requirement in
light of the present need for transplantable organs. The number of in-
dividuals awaiting transplantation far surpasses the number of organs
likely to be secured through informed consent and legal donations.
Ideally, statutes should provide that cadaver organs may be removed
whenever they can be used to save human life, even over the objection
of the deceased or of the next of kin. Furthermore, as has been pre-
viously proposed, 0 5 provision should be made for routine removal of
cadaver organs unless, before removal, the physician is notified that the
deceased or next of kin had specifically objected to the donation of an
organ. Writers in this area feel that the great value of cadaver organs
,in the preservation of human life dictates that the burden of action be
shifted from the physician to the dead donor or his next of kin,'06 be-
cause the saving of human life is the first and most important principle
of medical ethics.107 It is submitted that the draftsmen of the Uniform
Anatomical Gift Act gave last priority to this first rule of human exist-
ence.
Secondly, the gift approach, found in section 4 of the Act, is en-
tirely unrealistic in light of present human need for organs. Only about
25 percent of the persons who die leave wills, and most of these are far
beyond middle age.108 The most likely source for organs will be young
persons who die of brain injury or sudden heart attacks but rarely do
these individuals have a will. Securing organs from young individuals
under the Act not only requires a clear definition of the time of death,
but also demands informed consent of the next of kin at a time when
the injured is "dead cerebrally," but alive from the standpoint of kidney
or cardiac functions. The Uniform Anatomical Gift Act is a sound be-
ginning; but a better solution will be required if we are to save the
lives of thousands still dying for lack of a transplantable organ.
The Act leaves unsettled the important questions of the determi-
nation of the time of death, the need for quality control in organ trans-
plantation through tissue typing, and the unrestricted transportation
across state lines of organs or individuals involved in transplants. The
Act also fails to clarify the issue of who shall receive the transplanted
organ. Since the total number of organs available through gifts is al-
most certain to be far less than that required for recipient needs, this is
105. Sanders & Dukeminier, Medical Advance and Legal Lag: Hemodialysis
and Kidney Transplantation, 15 U.C.L.A.L. REV. 357, 412 (1968).
106. Id.
107. Id. at 413.
108. See R. POWELL, CASES AND MATERIALS ON TRUSTS AND WILLs 11 (1960).
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a most crucial weakness. The authority of the medical examiner or
coroner, who has jurisdiction over the victims of fatal accidents and
patients not under medical care prior to death, to release organs for
transplantation is still unclear; but his authority in most states is limited
to performing an autopsy and does not include the donation of organs for
transplantation. 09 It is possible, therefore, for a conflict to arise be-
tween the coroner and the next of kin with respect to donation of
organs. The Uniform Anatomical Gift Act does not permit voluntary
donation of organs by the coroner, but states that the coroner remains
subject to the autopsy laws of each state. Such a conflict could deny
access to much needed organs. If uniform statutory provisions are to
solve the legal problems inherent in transplantation, then such questions
must be satisfactorily answered.
IV. The Definition of Death
A. Determination by the Medical Community
A central issue, touched upon only briefly in the Uniform Anatom-
ical Gift Act,110 is the definition of the time of death. If the prospect
for successful function of the transplanted organ in the recipient is to
occur, the definition of death is crucial. This is particularly so for the
transplantation of unpaired organs, such as the heart, where a live,
beating organ must be transplanted into the recipient. The majority
of heart and liver donors are young healthy individuals who have sus-
tained major trauma rendering them unconscious. At that time a con-
flict develops between the wishes of the injured party, the next of kin, the
physician, and the possible recipient regarding transplantation of an or-
gan. Informed consent under these circumstances is impossible for the
donor. Careful studies conducted by physicians and psychologists have
shown that under these trying emotional circumstances, consent, or
the lack of it, on the part of the next of kin is hardly a logical and rational
process. It is submitted that a more reliable safeguard is provided by
the presence of an informed, conscientious and responsible investigator.
Informed consent for the donation of live organs often requires a
clear, public understanding of the nature and time of death. The
definition of death has been the focus of major interest for both the
patient who desires to receive a live organ transplant, and the physician
who is striving to save the life of the potential recipient.
109. See definition of autopsy, note 65 supra. But see VA. CODE ANN. § 19.1-46.1
(Supp. 1968), discussed note 10 supra.
110. See GIFT ACT § 7(b).
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Until the era of transplantation, death was something that every-
one recognized and no one needed to define. The standard definition of
death which satisfied everyone was "[s]uspension or cessation of vital
processes of the body, as heart beat and respiration.""' Traditionally,
the doctor would feel for the pulse, listen for the heart beat, check for
respiratory movements, stimulate the individual in an effort to arouse
consciousness or some type of motor or sensory response, and in the
absence of any of these observable evidences of life, he would pro-
nounce the patient dead. Clearly, death was so unmistakable it did
not require a legal decision.
However, the recent ability of doctors to control the functions of
organs by external devices, over which the patient has no control, has
altered the entire concept of death. In former days, the patient was
either alive or dead, depending upon vital forces operating only within
his body. If the heart stopped, he was dead; if respiration stopped, he
was dead; and if brain function stopped, heart and lung function gen-
erally stopped immediately thereafter, and death was evident. Death
was a rapid continuum beginning with one vital organ, progressing
rapidly throughout the entire body so that its presence was unmistakable.
Nowadays, external devices can supplant vital organ functions and death
must be defined in social and moral terms, as well as purely physical
terms. For example, it is commonplace for surgeons working on the
heart to stop the beating of the heart for "prolonged periods" during
an operation, in order to permit skilled and refined operations within the
heart. The heart can be stimulated to return to normal function either by
an electrical impulse, or by a juggling of important electrolytes within the
body fluids upon which beating or cessation of the heart depend. A
person is certainly not dead in the traditional sense merely because his
heart is not beating. Similarly, excellent machines can take over com-
pletely the function of respiration, delivering a normal alveolar venti-
lation to the patient with respect to pressures within the lung and
volumes of gases exchanged by the lung, without the person himself
making a single respiratory movement. Indeed, many patients in crit-
ical condition are "alive" only so long as the respirator is delivering
vital gases to their lungs, or electrical wires are pacing the heart beat,
but "dead" as soon as the mechanical devices are disconnected from the
electrical power sources in the patient's room.
The modem definition of death must often depend on whether the
mechanical devices are minimizing the suffering, or preserving the life
of a potentially salvageable individual, or whether they are merely sus-
111. DoRLAND'S ILLUSTRATED MEDICAL DICTIONARY 387 (24th ed. 1965).
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taining the existence of a hopelessly tortured and essentially destroyed
entity.
From the standpoint of the transplant surgeon and recipient the
ideal definition of death would be one where the donor is "legally dead,"
but his transplantable organs are normally alive and functioning.
For practical purposes, a patient is dead when he is insensate, un-
conscious, unable to be aware of his surroundings and a hopeless bur-
den to himself and to society. The brain is the most sensitive organ
in the body to anoxia, and once the central nervous system tissue has
been irreparably damaged it cannot regenerate-nor can brain function
be transplanted. Experience has amply demonstrated that many pa-
tients with brain damage have no possibility whatsoever of recovery,
and society is willing to declare a patient "dead" when there is no
possibility of recovery of consciousness. The definition of death, then,
has become both a medical and a legal problem; the individual should
have a right to dispose of his organs or body; and an equal right to
die with dignity. Death with dignity implies that the physician should
have the right to disconnect the respirator, or to discontinue the electrical
pacemaker in a patient who has no possibility of recovery. The defi-
nition of death is no longer a hypothetical problem in view of the
tremendous need for live organs for transplantation; therefore, new laws
must be written, not only to legally define "death," but also to permit
transplantation of live organs from legally "dead" patients.
Recently developed mechanical techniques for the support of
cardiac and respiratory functions have demonstrated a need to revise
criteria used in determining death. As a result attention has been fo-
cused on "brain death" as a valid indication of real death. "Brain death"
implies a permanently functionless brain with complete unreceptivity and
unresponsiveness to inner need and externally applied stimuli, and is
demonstrated by lack of spontaneous muscular movement, lack of spon-
taneous breathing, absence of reflexes, a perfectly flat electrocardio-
gram, and failure of all of the above findings to change or improve
over at least a twenty-four hour period. These criteria for death have
been extensively studied by Dr. Henry Beecher, Dorr Professor of Re-
search and Anesthesia at Harvard Medical School, and have been termed
the "Harvard criteria": (1) deep unconsciousness with no response to
external stimuli or internal need; (2) absence of movement and breath-
ing; (3) lack of reflexes in the body; and (4) a flat or isoelectric electro-
encephalogram made twenty-four hours apart serving as useful and con-
firmatory evidence of death. 12
112. Ad Hoe Committee of the Harvard Medical School to Examine the Definition
of Brain Death, A Definition of Irreversible Coma, 205 J.A.M.A. 337, 337-38 (1968).
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Most everyone now agrees that when the brain is "dead," extra-
ordinary mechanical supports should be discontinued. Indeed, the
family of the patient often wishes to terminate the agonizing death
watch and welcomes the discontinuance of extraordinary measures, such
as artificial circulation and respiration, to keep the patient "alive."
The Ad Hoc Committee of the Harvard Medical School emphasized that
for "brain death" to be verified even the most intensively painful stimuli
should not evoke any vocal or other response from the unreceptive and
unresponsive patient. 113 The Committee lists several tests to be used
in establishing an irreversible coma. Observations for at least an hour
should be made to insure that there is no spontaneous muscular move-
ment, no spontaneous respiration, and no response to stimuli such as
pain, sound, or light. If the patient is on a mechanical respirator, it
should be turned off for three minute intervals in an effort to ascertain
whether or not spontaneous respiration will occur. An electrocardio-
graph should be run properly and at least ten full minutes of recording
should take place before the electrocardiogram is pronounced flat.
Furthermore, the patient should not be under hypothermia or sedation
at the time the flat electrograph is recorded.1 14 The Committee further
advised that the decision of death should be made and declared by the
physician with the agreement of the family prior to turning off the
respirator."1
5
It should be emphasized that the decision at the time of death is
a medical decision. Before mechanical supportive devices are discon-
nected, death is declared by the physician in charge, preferably in con-
sultation with one or more additional physicians directly involved in the
case. It is both unsound and undesirable to force the family to make
the decision.
If transplantation of an organ is involved, the Uniform Anatomical
Gift Act states that the time of death must be determined by the physician
who attends the donor at his death, or, if none, the physician who
certifies the death. 1 6 The act further provides that the physician who
determines the time of death must not participate in the removal or
transplantation of the organ."' It is generally agreed that death must
be declared prior to discontinuation of resuscitative measures-that is,
death must be declared and then the respirator turned off.
113. Id. at 337.
114. Id. at 337-38.
115. Id. at 338.
116. G-r AcT § 7(b).
117. Id.
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B. Determination by the Legal Community
Medical opinions concerning the definition of death are still sub-
ject to legal contestation, for the exact time of death often becomes an
important issue in the disposition of the property belonging to the indi-
vidual who has died. The traditional definition of death has been:
"The cessation of life; the ceasing to exist; defined by physicians as a
total stoppage of the circulation of the blood, and a cessation of the
animal and vital functions consequent thereupon, such as respiration,
pulsation . . . .,118
In recent decisions involving the definition of death, courts have
clung to the concept of the total cessation of all vital signs as the legal
definition of death."9  Three cases are particularly noteworthy. In
Thomas v. Anderson'" two men, who were joint tenants of certain real
property, died within an hour of one another. The plaintiff claimed that
there was insufficient evidence to support a finding that the two deaths
were not simultaneous. He further claimed that simultaneous, under
section 296.2 of the Probate Code, means substantially or approximately
at the same time. In response, the court said, "death occurs precisely
when life ceases and does not occur until the heart stops beating and
respiration ends. Death is not a continuous event and is an event that
takes place at a precise time."''
In the later California case of Estate of Schmidt,"' the appellate
court restated with approval the lower court's discussion of the time
of death:
Medical opinion in this case varied as to when death occurred. In
the opinion of the medical experts death might be the inability to
resuscitate or an irreversible coma. However, for purposes of this
decision this Court considers death as defined in Black's Diction-
ary, Third Edition: "as the total stoppage of the circulation of
the blood and cessation of the animal and vital functions of the
body such as respiration and pulsation.'
23
In the case of Smith v. Smith,12 4 a husband and wife were in-
volved in an auto accident. The husband was found dead at the scene
of the accident, and the wife was taken unconscious to the hospital and
118. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 488 (4th ed. 1951) (emphasis added).
119. Smith v. Smith, 229 Ark. 579, 317 S.W.2d 276 (1958); Estate of Schmidt,
261 Cal. App. 2d 262, 67 Cal. Rptr. 347 (1968); Thomas v. Anderson, 96 Cal. App.
2d 371, 211 P.2d 478 (1950); Schmit v. Pierce, 244 S.W.2d 120 (Mo. 1961).
120. 96 Cal. App. 2d 371, 215 P.2d 478 (1950).
121. Id. at 376, 215 P.2d at 482.
122. Estate of Schmidt, 261 Cal. App. 2d 262, 67 Cal. Rptr. 347 (1968).
123. Id. at 273, 67 Cal. Rptr. at 854.
124. 229 Ark. 579, 317 S.W.2d 275 (1958).
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remained in coma caused by brain injury. She died in the hospital 17
days later. The petitioner argued that the two people died simultane-
ously, but the Arkansas Supreme Court, relying on Black's definition
of death, ruled that the petition must be dismissed as a matter of law.
The court stated:
Admittedly this condition did not exist and as a matter of fact
it would be too much of a strain of credulity for us to believe
any evidence offered to the fact that Mrs. Smith was dead scien-
tifically or otherwise, unless the conditions set out in the definition
existed.125
They added: "Likewise, we take judicial notice that one breathing
though unconscious is not dead."'126 The Arkansas court felt that there
was no need to prove uncontroverted facts. Dismissal prevented pro-
longation of the trial by unnecessary proof and perpetration of fraud
upon the court by quasi-scientists called into court to controvert
settled scientific principles. The Arkansas Supreme Court thus con-
sidered the definition of death to be a settled scientific and observable
biological fact.
While the legal and medical situations surrounding death might be
different, in each instance the exact time of death is determined by a
physician. Under most circumstances, the legal definition of death may
be satisfactory; but it would certainly appear reasonable to adopt the
medical definition in cases involving irreversible coma. There will be
rare legal cases in which two individuals will be rendered unconscious
at the same time, both will lapse into irreversible coma, and both will
inevitably die. In situations of this type the exact moment of death will
be determined by the physician and inheritance may be determined
according to who is pronounced dead first. Special court rulings might
be necessary in these rare situations to determine the inheritance by
relatives of the deceased parties.
A legal definition of death is important for determination of legal
rights. Death, however, should not be based on some dictionary defi-
nition, but on scientific criteria used by physicians. Such a definition
is properly a medical rather than a legal problem, and if death is to be
redefined, it is the physician who must do it.
125. Id. at 586-87, 317 S.W.2d at 279.
126. Id. at 589, 317 S.W.2d at 281.
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Appendix A*
Donation Statutes
Schematic Overview of Donation Statutes
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* Reprinted by permission from MEDICAL-LEGAL ASPECTS OF TISSUE
TRANSPLANTATION, Division of Medical Sciences, National Academy of Sciences-
National Research Council, Washington, D.C. (1968) (revised and updated to reflect
recent legislation).
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Appendix B*
Existing Donation Statutes-Analysis by Jurisdiction
Each jurisdiction is discussed below in alphabetical order as to its treatment of,
and by reference to, each of the following provisions:
1. Individual authority to donate.
2. Next of kin authority to donate.
3. Possible conflict between wishes of the donor and the next of kin.
4. Donees.
5. Purposes for which donations can be made.
6. Mechanism of gift-Wills.
7. Mechanism of gift-Other written instruments.
8. Mechanism of gift--Cards.
9. Mechanism of gift by next of kin-Recorded telephonic consent.
10. Revocation or amendment of gift.
11. Protection from liability for doctors and others acting in accordance with the
statute.
12. The problem of conflicts of law.
13. The time of death.
ALABAMA
ALA. CODE tit. 22, §§ 184(1)-(3) (1958).
1. Any person, 21 years of age or more, of sound mind, and an inhabitant of
this state may donate all or part of his body.
3. Any person, firm, association, or corporation who interferes with the dispo-
sition of the body according to a donation is guilty of a misdemeanor.
5. Donation may be made for the advancement of medical science, the replace-
ment of diseased or worn out parts of other humans, or the rehabilitation of human
parts or organs.
7. Donation may be accomplished by an instrument in writing, executed as a deed,
and filed for record in the office of the judge of probate of the county of the donor's
residence or of the county in which the donor is confined in a hospital.
10. Revocation is permitted by filing a similar written instrument in one of the
two places mentioned above, provided it is filed before the donor's death.
ALASKA
ALAsKA STAT. § 13.05.035 (1962) (authority provided for eyes only).
1. A person of legal age and sound mind and a resident of this state may donate
his eyes.
3. The donated eyes are to be removed by a licensed physician after the donor's
death with no consent of the donor's heirs or devisees being required.
4. Donation may be made to a person or a hospital.
7. Donation may be made by written instrument.
* By permission of the Georgetown Law Journal, Appendix B is partially re-
printed from the article Transplantation and the Law: A Need For Organized Sen-
sitivity, by Alfred M. and Blair L. Sadler, 57 GEo. L.J. 1, 34-54 (App. C) (1968).
Extensive revision has been required, however, to reflect recent legislative activity in
the field of tissue and organ transplantation.
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ARIZONA
ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 36-841 to -845 (1956).
1. Any person who may make a will is permitted to direct the disposition of the
whole or any part of his body.
4. Donees may include any teaching institution, university, college, the state de-
partment of health, a facility designated by the Anatomy Board of Arizona, a legally
licensed hospital, or agency operating a tissue, eye, bone, cartilage, or blood bank.
Provision is made for the nondesignated donee.
5. Donations may be made for the purposes of medical science and the rehabili-
tation of the maimed.
6. Donations may be made by will.
7. Donations may be made by a signed and acknowledged instrument. A gift
made by will, codicil, or other signed and acknowledged written instrument shall be-
come effective immediately upon the death of the donor or testator.
11. A person, association, or corporation shall not be subject to liability for any
act performed in carrying out instructions of the donor or testator as to disposal of
his body for the purposes specified in the act.
ARKANSAS
ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 82-408 to -410 (1960); §§ 82-410.1 to -410.3 (Supp. 1967).
1., 3., 5., 7., and 10. Same as ALABAMA, supra.
7. The only appreciable difference is that Arkansas does not require the instru-
ment to be "executed as a deed."
CALIFORNIA
CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 7100, 7113, 7150-58
CAL. PROB. CODE § 20.
1. Any person of 18 years and of sound mind may donate.
2. Next of kin may also donate according to a priority, included in the statute.
3. The person(s) otherwise entitled to control the disposition of the remains un-
der the provisions of this section shall faithfully carry out the directions of the decedent,
subject only to the duties of the coroner.
4. A teaching institution, university, college, legally licensed hospital, licensed
physician or surgeon, the State Director of Public Health, or any nonprofit blood bank,
artery bank, or other therapeutic service operated by an agency approved by the Di-
rector of Public Health may become a donee.
10. Revoked by execution and delivery to donee of a signed revocation, oral
revocation, witnessed by two people, death bed revocation made to his physician, by
a card carried on donor's person revoking the gift, or revoking the will in which the
gift was made.
11. Those proceeding within the provisions of this statute shall not be held liable
in any civil action.
13. Time of death is determined by the attending physician.
COLORADO
COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 91-3-9 (1964).
1. A person may provide for the disposition of all or any portion of his body
upon death.
7. Donation shall be by written consent.
11. No cause of action for damages shall accrue to any person arising out of the
removal of all or any portion of the body of a deceased, provided said person had no
actual knowledge of any revocation of such consent.
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CONNECTICUT
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 19-139a to -139b (Supp. 1969).
1. Any person of 21 years and of sound mind may donate all or part of his body.
3. The next of kin, or other personal legally in custody of the body, shall carry
out the direction of the decedent and notify the donee.
4. Any hospital or medical institution approved by the Commissioner of Health
may be a donee. When no donee is named, the Commissioner may designate one.
5. Donation may be made for scientific, educational, or therapeutic use. De-
livery of the body is prohibited when death results from certain enumerated diseases.
Donation of the entire body shall take precedence over donation of any part thereof.
6. A will is a valid mechanism which becomes effective immediately upon death
regardless of whether it is ever probated.
7. Donation may be made by any written instrument signed by the donor and
witnessed by two competent witnesses.
10. Revocation may be accomplished by an instrument similar to the one used for
donation.
11. The proper use of a designated part of the body shall not be the basis for
civil liability.
DELAWARE
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 24, § 1780-88 (Supp. 1968).
1. Any person 21 years of age or older of sound mind may donate his body or a
part thereof.
4. Gifts may be made to an individual, licensed hospital, institution engaged in
medical research and advancement, and organ repositories.
5. Donations may be made for the advancement of medical science or trans-
plantation and no other.
7. Donations may be made by written disposition signed in the presence of two
witnesses.
10. The only valid means of revocation is by a written instrument signed in the
presence of two witnesses.
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
D. C. CODE ANN. § 2-251 to -257 (1967).
1. Any person who, in this jurisdiction, has the capacity to make a will may
donate his tissue.
2. Any person having the right to a body for the purpose of burial may donate
any tissue from such body. An order of priority is included in the statute. Any such
person may make such donation, provided that tissue shall not be removed pursuant
to a donation made by any one of such persons designated in this subsection if, before
such tissue is removed, any one of such persons shall, in writing, notify the tissue bank
which is to remove the tissue that he objects to such removal.
4. Donations may be made to any "tissue bank" licensed under this act. Any
physician or hospital validly operating a tissue bank shall have full authority to take
the tissue so donated and use the same for the purposes enumerated.
5. Any person who donates his tissue may, but shall not be required to, designate
the purpose for which his tissue is to be used.
6. Donations may be made by a will or codicil, becoming effective immediately
upon the death of the testator or donor and constituting the authority for any physician
or hospital to operate a tissue bank to remove said tissue.
7. Donations may be made by any written statement, signed by the donor and
witnessed by two persons of legal age, and shall be liberally construed to effectuate the
intent and purpose of the person desiring to donate. If any one of the specified next
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of kin donate tissue by a written statement, such statement shall be signed by him and
similarly witnessed.
FLORIDA
FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 245.11-.12 (1961); § 736.08-.18 (1964).
1. A person may donate any part of his body. A person of sound mind who dies
within the state may leave his body to the anatomical board by will.
3. No consent or permission from the personal representative or the heirs of
the deceased is required.
4. Donation can be made to any state, county, or district hospital or medical
school, private hospitals, eyebanks, body banks, or to a specific beneficiary. Specific
provisions are included which deal with the open-ended donation and the unavailable
donee. The trustee of a trust may also be a valid donee.
5. Donation can be made to the anatomical board to provide material for study
in medical schools, dental schools, and teaching hospitals; for eyesight restoration pur-
poses; for grafting or transplantation; or for experimentation and scientific research
purposes.
6. Donation can be made by last will and testament or codicil. Subsequent pro-
bate shall not affect the validity of the donation.
7. Any written instrument is a valid instrument. No witness is required and no
particular wording is necessary.
8. A wallet sized card is a valid instrument. A model form is included.
10. Revocation is specifically provided for only when the bequest is made to a
trustee.
11. No liability shall result against any bank, hospital, medical school, physician,
or surgeon who acts under the provisions of this act.
GEORGIA
GA. CODE ANN. H9 88-2001 to -2009 (Supp. 1968) (authority provided for eyes only).
1. Any person of legal age and sound mind may donate his eyes.
2. The surviving spouse or all of the immediate next of kin may donate.
4. Donees include nonprofit eyebanks or institutions or persons operating or
working in such institutions.
5. Purposes include sight preservation or restoration and medical education or in-
struction.
7. Donation shall be made by a written instrument which shall designate the
donee eyebank. It must be signed by the donor in the presence of two witnesses and
must be filed with the parties maintaining the donee eyebank.
10. Revocation may be executed in a manner similar to donation with the donee
eyebank acknowledging receipt of the revocation instrument within a period of ten
days following its receipt.
11. No civil or criminal liability shall accrue to persons proceeding in accordance
with the act's provisions.
HAWAII
HAwAn Rnv. STAT. §§ 327-1 to 327-8, 327-21 to 327-24 (1968).
1. Every person of testamentary capacity may provide for the disposition of his
body after death.
3. The persons or persons otherwise entitled by law to control the disposition of
a decedent's body shall faithfully carry out the directions of the decedent.
4. Donations may be made to a university, hospital, or institution within the
state authorized to teach or conduct research in medicine, anatomy, or surgery, or
having a medical preparatory or medical graduate course of instruction. A donee may
refuse the gift under specified circumstances.
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5. The donee shall use the donated parts solely for the purpose of teaching and
research to promote medical science and education, including the retention of such
material as may be needed for such purpose. This would not appear to include
transplantation or other purely therapeutic purposes.
6. Donations may be made by will. The directions of the testator shall be
immediately carried out regardless of the validity of the will in other respects or of
the fact that the will may not be offered for or admitted to probate until a later date.
7. Donations made by a written instrument other than a will shall be witnessed
by two persons and provide for written consent to the donation by specified persons.
No particular words shall be necessary, and a donation shall become effective
immediately upon the death of the donor.
10. A donation may be revoked by the donor at any time prior to his death by
the execution of a subsequent written instrument.
11. A university, hospital, or institution to which a body is donated or any agent,
officer, or employee of such shall not be liable for any damage or subject to criminal
prosecution for using the body or parts thereof for teaching or scientific research pur-
poses.
IDAHO
IDAHO CODE ANN. §§ 39-3401-11 (Supp. 1969).
Idaho has adopted the UNIFORM ANATOMICAL GIFT ACT in its entirety.
ILLINOIS
ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 3, § 42a (Smith-Hurd 1961).
1. Every person of testamentary capacity may donate all or part of his body.
4. A charitable, educational, or research institution, university, college, State
Director of Public Health, State Director of Public Welfare, legally licensed hospital,
or any other organization intended and equipped to distribute human bodies or parts
thereof for the purposes expressed in this act may receive such a gift.
5. The donor may designate the purpose of the gift or may use the gift as he sees
fit.
6. Donation by will becomes effective immediately upon the death of the donor.
7. Any written instrument signed by the donor in the presence of two or more
credible witnesses also is valid.
11. No person acting in good faith pursuant to the direction of the instrument and
without knowledge of a subsequent revocation shall be liable for such actions.
INDIANA
IND. ANN. STAT. §§ 6-510 to -512 (Supp. 1969).
1. Every person of testamentary capacity may give the whole or any part of his
body.
2. Section 63-603 provides that any duly incorporated medical or dental college,
or any duly licensed physician or surgeon shall not be prevented from acquiring, by
gift or otherwise, from persons having lawful authority to dispose of the same, the
dead body of any human being for the purpose of post-mortem examination, dissection,
or other scientific use. Although this is hardly a donation clause and the term "scientific
use" is very general, a broad reading of this section might allow donation for medical
purposes by the persons having lawful authority to dispose of the deceased.
4. Donees may include the State Anatomical Board or any college or university,
or other person, corporation, association, or agency, public or private, which is willing
and equipped to receive and to use the donated body for the enumerated purposes.
5. Donation by the decedent is valid for scientific, educational, therapeutic, or
medical use or for other similar uses.
6. Donation by will becomes effective immediately upon the death of the donor.
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7. Any written instrument, if signed by the donor in the presence of two witnesses
and then signed by those witnesses, shall be a valid donation mechanism.
11. No person acting in good faith within the provisions of this act shall be sub-
ject to liability unless he has knowledge that said donation has been revoked.
IOWA
IOWA CODE AfxqN. § 142.12 (Supp. 1968).
1. Every inhabitant of this state of the age of 21 years or more and of sound
mind may donate all or any part of his body within the provisions of this act.
2. The person(s) having the right to a body for burial may consent to such use
of the body or parts thereof.
5. Donation may be made for the purpose of scientific use, or for other advance-
ment of medical science, or for the replacement or rehabilitation of diseased or worn
out parts or organs of other humans.
6. A will shall be a valid donation instrument.
7. Donation may also be made by a written instrument executed in the same
manner as a deed.
10. Revocation may be accomplished in a manner similar to the original donation.
KANSAS
KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 65-3201 to -3208 (Supp. 1968).
1. Any individual who is competent to execute a will may give all or any part
of his body.
2. See ACT §§ 2(b) & (c).
4. SeeACT§ 3.
5. See AcT § 3.
6. See AT § 4(a).
7. and 8. See ACT § 4(b).
10. See AcT § 6.
11. See ACT § 7(c).
12. This problem is largely alleviated by the protection provision which applies
to "the terms of a gift under this act, or any similar act."
13. The time of death shall be determined by the physician in attendance upon
the donor's terminal illness or death; he shall not be a member of the team of surgeons
which transplants the part to another individual. Compare ACT § 7(b).
KENTUCKY
Ky. REv. STAT. AN. §§ 311.352, 311.354 (1963).
1. Any person in the Commonwealth of the age of 21 years or more and of
sound mind may make a gift, grant, or bequest of all or parts of his body.
2. The persons having the right to a body for burial may likewise consent to
such use of the body or part thereof as set forth in this statute. An order of priority is
included.
4. Acceptable donees include any professor, medical school, or college, or any
responsible person or group of persons, natural or corporate, whom the State Board of
Health finds is equipped to properly carry out the purposes of this act.
5. Included among purposes are educational or scientific study and transplantation.
6. Donation may be executed by will.
7. Donation may be made by a written instrument executed in the presence of at
least two attesting witnesses.
10. Revocation can be accomplished in the same manner as the original legacy or
grant.
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LOUISIANA
LA. REV. STAT. § 17.2351-.2359 (Supp. 1969).
1. Any person who is competent to make a will may donate.
2. Next of kin may also donate according to a priority, included in the statute.
3. The body or body part may be used in accordance with the terms of the do-
nation immediately upon the death of the donor and without order of court or
authorization by next of kin, or any other person.
4. Donees may be any hospital, surgeon, physician, medical or dental school, an
organ repository, or an individual.
5. Donations may be made for medical or dental education, research, advance-
ment of medical science, therapy or transplantation.
6. See ACT § 4(a).
7. A donation may be made by written instrument signed in the presence of two
witnesses.
8. The gift document may consist of a properly executed card carried on the
donor's person.
10. See ACT § 6.
MAINE
Mn. Rnv. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, §§ 2881, 2889 (1965).
Section 2881 provides that if any resident of the state requests or consents that
after death his body be delivered to a regular physician or surgeon for the advancement
of anatomical science, it may be used for that purpose, unless some kindred or family
connection makes objection. This authority is thus narrowly circumscribed in purpose
and is not valid without approval of next of kin.
The donation authority presented in § 2889 provides for the donation of eyes only.
1. A person of legal age and sound mind has the right to direct the manner in
which his eyes shall be disposed of after his death.
4. A donee may be an individual, hospital, institution, an agency engaged in sight
restoration or a bank maintained for the storage, preservation, and use of human eyes
or parts thereof. The donee need not be designated.
5. Donation can be made for the advancement of medical science or for the
replacement or rehabilitation of diseased eyes or wornout or injured parts of the eyes
of living human beings.
7. Authorization for donation shall be by written instrument signed by the donor
and witnessed by two persons of legal age. No particular form or words shall be re-
quired, provided that the instrument conveys the clear intention of the purpose of the
donor.
10. The gift may be revoked in a manner similar to the original grant.
11. The donee or physician shall not be liable civilly or criminally for removing
eyes under authorization valid within the terms of this act.
MARYLAND
MD. ANN. CODE art. 43, §§ 149H-S (Supp. 1968).
1. Any person who is over 21 years of age and competent to execute a will may
donate all or any part of his body.
2. See ACT §§ 2(b) & (c).
4. and 5. See ACT § 3.
6. See ACT § 4(a).
7. and 8. See ACT § 4(b).
9. If the gift is by next of kin designated in the act, it shall be by written or
telegraphic consent.
10. See ACT § 6.
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11. See Acr § 7(c).
12. A document of gift executed in another state and in accord with the laws of
that state thereunto pertaining or executed in a territory or possession of the United
States under the control and dominion of the federal government and in accord
with a federal law, shall be deemed valid as a document of gift within this state.
13. The time of death shall be determined by the physician in attendance upon the
donor's terminal illness or certifying his death, and said physician shall not be a member
of the team of physicians which transplants the part of another individual. Compare
ACT § 7(b).
MASSACHUSETTS.
MAss. ANN. LAws ch. 113, §§ 7-10 (Supp. 1969).
1. Any person who has attained the age of 21 years may make a gift of his tissue
or organs, to take effect prior to embalmment of his body.
4. Donees include any hospital, entity organized for the purpose of collecting or
storing human tissue or organs, or medical school licensed by the Commonwealth. A
provision dealing with the open-ended donation is included. Except in the case of a gift
of the entire body, the donee shall have 24 hours following the death of the donor to
remove the part(s) of the body given to the donee; and thereafter, whether or not the
donee has so acted, the donor's body may be claimed by the person(s) otherwise en-
titled thereto. The provisions of this section shall in no way prevent the final interment
of any human body.
5. Gifts may be made for medical or scientific research, for the dissemination of
information relative thereto, for transplantation to living persons, or for the promotion
of anatomical study and teaching.
6. Gifts made by will, if signed by the donor and witnessed by three persons,
are valid whether or not the will is offered for probate.
7. Donations may be made by a written instrument signed by the donor and
witnessed by three persons. No "instrument shall be effective . . . unless a certificate
of a registered physician is attached thereto to the effect that at the time said donor
signed said instrument the donor was, in the opinion of said physician, of sound mind
and not under the influence of narcotic drugs." An agent, servant, or employee of the
donee shall be disqualified from witnessing any such instrument.
10. An instrument of gift may be revoked by destruction by the donor or by a
written instrument of revocation signed by the donor, which need not be witnessed.
11. Whoever, in good faith relies upon an instrument purporting to make a gift,
delivers the tissue, organs, or whole body or any part of a donor to a donee shall not be
liable for having made such delivery.
MICHIGAN
MicH. Comp. LAws ANN. § 328.251-.257 (1967).
1. Any person of full age and sound mind may donate all or any part of his
anatomy.
4. Any medical or educational institution or any person may be a donee.
5. The donor can specify any purpose; if no purpose is specified, the donee can
use the body part for any medical or educational purpose.
7. Donation may be made by written instrument signed by the donor in the
presence of two competent witnesses who shall also sign the instrument. The written
instrument shall be retained on file with the donee, who shall produce the same upon
demand of any interested person at the time of the donor's death.
10. The donor may revoke the gift by demanding return of the written instrument
and any copies thereof.
11. Any licensed medical practitioner or medical or educational institution who
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removes the part designated shall not be liable for damages in a civil suit for removal
of the part.
MINNESOTA
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 525.18 (1969).
1. Every person of sound mind, not a minor, may dispose of the whole or any
part of his body.
4. Donations may be made to a teaching institution, university, college, State
Board of Public Health, or legally licensed hospital.
5. Donations may be made for the use of one of the above donees or as expressly
designated by the donor.
6. Donations may be executed by a will attested and subscribed in the donor's
presence by two or more competent witnesses.
MISSISSIPPI
MISS. CODE ANN. § 278.5 (Supp. 1969).
1. Any person 21 years of age and over and of sound and disposing mind may
enter into a contract to donate his eyes, heart, kidney, or other transplantable part of
his human body.
3. Any contract entered into under the terms of this act is binding upon the
surviving spouse or other heirs of the deceased who have the right under general law
to claim his body.
4. Contracts may be made with a qualified hospital or medical school.
5. Contracts may be made for medical science or other medical purposes.
10. Any person entering into "such a contract" may, during his or her lifetime,
revoke by written instrument signed by both parties, said contract in its entirely, pro-
vided, however, that if any such person has received any monetary consideration for
entering into the contract, he shall repay such consideration to those from whom he re-
ceived it, in full, plus 6% interest from the date of the signing of the contract.
MISSOURI
Mo. ANN. STAT. § 194.190 (Supp. 1968).
1. Any person of sound mind and 18 years of age or older may donate all or any
part of his body.
2. Although there is no provision which affirmatively gives the next of kin
donation authority, one section provides that no cause of action in tort shall accrue to
any person out of the removal or use of a body part, "if the consent of the decedent
was given, or consent was given by a person upon whom devolves by law the right to
control the disposition of the remains of a deceased person as defined herein ... .
(emphasis added). This may be interpreted to give donation authority to next of kin.
3. The person legally in custody of the body for burial shall faithfully carry out
the directions of decedent.
4. The donee shall be any college, university, licensed hospital, or the State
Anatomical Board.
5. The donation may be for scientific, educational, or therapeutic use.
6. A bequest in a will shall become effective immediately upon the death of the
donor without regard to whether it is ever offered or admitted to probate.
7. Any writing will suffice and no special words of gift shall be necessary, pro-
vided the written authorization is signed by the donor and witnessed by two persons of
legal age or acknowledged as is required of deeds to real estate.
10. The gift may be revoked by a similar writing.
11. Provision 2 above provides the basic protection, which is applicable, notwith-
standing the invalidity of such consent, if the person relying thereon acted in good
faith or had no actual knowledge of the revocation of such consent.
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MONTANA
MoNT. REV. CODE ANN. § 69-2315 to 69-2323 (Supp. 1969).
Montana has adopted the UNwoRm ANATOMICAL GiFT Acr with some modifi-
cation. The most significant for the purposes of this paper is the alteration of section
2(a) to provide that a person 18 or older may provide for the disposition of all or any
part of his body upon death.
NEBRASKA
NEB. REv. STAT. H4 71-1339 to -1341 (1966).
1. Any person may direct the disposition of all or part of his remains.
2. Those persons having the right to control the disposition of the remains may,
when not inconsistent with directions given by the decedent, authorize the removal of any
specifically named organ or organs.
3. The persons entitled to control the disposition of the remains shall faithfully
carry out the directions of the decedent.
4. Donees include a teaching institution, university, college, legally licensed hos-
pital, the Director of Health, or any nonprofit blood bank, artery bank, or other
therapeutic service operated by any agency approved by the Director of Health.
6. If instructions are contained in a will, they shall be immediately carried out,
regardless of the adequacy of the will in other respects or of the fact that the will may
not be probated until a later date.
7. Donations may be made orally or by any written instrument.
11. A funeral director, physician, or cemetery authority shall not be liable to any
person(s) for carrying out the decedent's instructions, or the eligible donee for accepting
the gift.
NEVADA
NEv. REv. STAT. § 451.440-.450, 451.470-.480 (1963).
1. A person, prior to his death, may direct the disposition of all or part of his
body.
2. A relative qualified to authorize an autopsy can also authorize the removal of
any structure or organ from any human remains for the purposes described in this
statute.
3. The person(s) otherwise entitled to control the disposition of the remains
under the provisions of this section shall faithfully carry out the directions of the
decedent.
4. A donee may be a teaching institution, university, college, licensed hospital,
nonprofit blood bank, nonprofit artery bank, or nonprofit eyebank, or other agency
approved by the State Board of Health.
5. Donation can be made for the advancement of medical science or for other
therapeutic or scientific use.
6. A will shall be a valid instrument of donation, and tissue removal shall pro-
ceed immediately after death, regardless of the validity of the will in other respects.
7. Donation may also be accomplished by any other written instrument.
11. No funeral director, physician, or cemetery authority shall be liable to any




N.J. STAT. ANN. § 26:6-51 to -56 (Supp. 1968).
1. Any person of legal age may direct the disposition of all or any part of his body.
2. Any person entitled to control the disposition of the remains may direct the
disposition of any part or parts of the body of such person.
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3. No disposition shall be directed by any person included in provision 2 if he has
reason to believe after reasonable inquiry: (a) that the decedent has left instructions
for disposition of his body inconsistent therewith; (b) that decedent has expressed
objections to such use during his last illness; or (c) that the surviving spouse or any
surviving near relative of decedent objects. The person(s) included in provision 2 shall
permit the proper execution of such disposition made by the deceased. When the
requisite parts of the body have been removed in cases where the disposition of the en-
tire body has not been directed, the remains of such person, not so removed, shall be
the responsibility of and shall be under the control of the person having by law the
right to disposition thereof.
4. The donee may be, but does not have to be, a government agency, eyebank,
teaching institution, hospital, or physician, or a committee or group of physicians or
others, to take such action as may be necessary to accomplish said purpose upon his
death. The instrument of gift shall be delivered to the person designated therein to
carry out the purposes of said instrument.
5. A donation may be made for the advancement of medical science or the re-
placement or rehabilitation of diseased or worn out organs of similar character of
another living person.
7. Donations may be made by written instrument signed by the donor and wit-
nessed by two persons of legal age.
10. An instrument of gift may be revoked only by an instrument similarly executed
and delivered to the person to whom the original instrument was delivered, or in
whose custody the instrument is at that time.
11. Any person acting or authorizing such action in accordance with the provisions
of this act shall not be liable in damages for any action taken in making or carrying
out such instrument, unless he shall have actual knowledge of the delivery of an in-
strument revoking the power contained therein, except for wilful negligence or inten-
tional wrongdoing.
NEW MEXICO
N. M. STAT. ANN. §§ 12-11-6 to -14 (Supp. 1969).
New Mexico has adopted the UNIFORM ANATOMICAL GI=T AcT in its entirety.
NEW YORK
N.Y. PuB. HEALTH LAW §§ 4201, 4210 (McKinney Supp. 1968-69).
1. Any person 18 years of age or older has the right to direct the manner in which
his body shall be disposed of after death. "Body" refers to the whole or any part
thereof, including blood.
2. The surviving spouse or next of kin of the deceased, being charged by law
with the duty of burial, may authorize dissection for the sole purpose of ascertaining
the cause of death or "may authorize dissection for any other purpose." This section,
not part of the rest of the donation statute, would appear to authorize donations by
appropriate next of kin for medical research and therapy.
4. A donee may be an individual, a licensed hospital, institution, or agency en-
gaged in the advancement of medical science or the restoration of diseased, worn out,
or injured parts of living human beings, or a bank maintained for the storage, preser-
vation, and use of parts of the body. Provisions are made for the open-ended donation
and the unavailable donee.
5. Donations may be made solely for the advancement of medical science or for
the replacement or rehabilitation of diseased, worn out, or injured parts of the bodies
of living human beings.
7. Donations shall be made by written authorization of the deceased made during
his lifetime and signed by him in the presence of at least two witnesses, aged 18 or
over, who shall also sign the document. No particular form of words shall be neces-
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sary, provided that the instrument conveys the clear intention of the donor.
10. Revocation is permitted by a written instrument signed by the donor and
witnessed by two persons, aged 18 or over.
11. Any licensed hospital, donee, nurse, or physician who removes body parts
pursuant to a valid donation shall not be civilly or criminally liable.
NORTH CAROLINA
N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 90-216.1 to -216.5 (1965).
1. Any person who may otherwise validly make a will in this state may dispose
of the whole or any part of his body.
4. Donations may be made to a teaching institution, university, college, State
Department of Health, legally licensed agency or commission operating an eyebank,
bone or cartilage bank, a blood bank, or any other bank of a similar nature designated
for the rehabilitation of the maimed. The donor may designate the donee. Provisions
are made for the open-ended donation and the unavailable donee.
5. The donor may expressly designate the purpose for which his body or part
may be used, but such is not necessary. If no purpose is designated, the body or part
shall be used in accordance with the intention of the statute.
6. A donation may be made by will and testament or codicil and becomes
effective immediately upon the death of the testator. No particular form or words
shall be necessary or required, and the donation statement shall be liberally construed to
effectuate the donor's intent.
11. Any provision in any will or codicil donating the whole or any part of the
testator's body shall become effective immediately upon death. Any donee acting un-
der the authority of said instrument will be protected from liability.
NORTH DAKOTA
N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. §§ 23-06.1-01 to -09 (1969).
North Dakota has adopted the UNnORM ANATOMICAL G=T ACT with some
modification. The most significant, for the purposes of this paper, is the alteration of
section 2(a) to provide that every person over the age of 18 years and every person
under the age of 18 years with the written consent of one parent or guardian has the
right to direct the manner in which his body shall be disposed of after death.
OHIO
Omo REv. CODE ANN. §§ 2108.01-.03 (Page 1968).
1. A person who is 21 years of age or older and of sound mind may make a gift
of all or any part of his body effective upon his death.
3. The rights of a donee or his agent under a gift are superior to those of any
person claiming as spouse, relative, guardian, or any other relationship, and as such,
rights may be limited by the instrument of donation.
4. and 5. The following persons may be named as donee in a gift for the purposes
indicated: (a) a licensed physician or surgeon, or a hospital for medical education,
research, the advancement of medical science, aid in therapy, or transplantation to
replace diseased or deteriorated parts of other persons; (b) a medical school, college, or
university engaged in medical education and research, for its educational research or
scientific purposes; (c) a nonprofit blood bank, artery bank, eyebank, or other storage
facility for human parts to be used for therapy or transplantation for other persons, or
for medical education and research; (d) a named individual for transplantation or ther-
apy needed by him; and (e) any licensed physician or surgeon claiming the body, not
naming him, for any of the above purposes. A gift made under this section, in addition
to the authorizations contained in the instrument of gift, authorizes the donee or his
agent to perform only the surgical procedure necessary to carry out the gift. When
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the gift is of only a part(s) of the body, immediately following the removal of the
part(s) named, custody of the body shall be transferred to the next of kin.
7. Donations may be made by a written instrument signed by the donor or by
some person in his presence and at his express direction and subscribed by two wit-
nesses in the presence of the donor. Neither witness may have any affiliation with the
donee or the donee institution. Delivery or acceptance is not necessary. If the entire
body has been donated, next of kin may arrange last rites before the body is claimed by
the donee.
10. A gift may be revoked in the same manner as executed.
11. A person who, in good faith and in reliance upon an authorization made
under this act, and without notice of revocation thereof, takes possession of, performs
surgical operations upon, removes tissue, substances, or parts from a human body,
refuses such a gift, or unknowingly fails to carry out the wishes of the donor according
to this act is not liable for damages in a civil action for such an act.
OKLAHOMA
OKLA. STAT. tit. 63, §§ 2201-09 (Supp. 1969).
Oklahoma has adopted the UNIFORM ANATOMIcAL GIFT AcT with some modifi-
cation. The most significant, for the purposes of this paper, being the alteration of
section 2(a) to provide that any adult of sound mind may give all or any part of his
body for any purpose specified in section 4, the gift effective on death.
OREGON
Ou. REv. STAT. §§ 97.130-.134 (1967-68).
1. A person of testamentary capacity may give the whole or part of his body.
2. The right to control the disposition of the remains of the decedent, unless other
directions have been given by him, vests in his surviving spouse, his surviving children,
his surviving parents, and the kindred to him, in that order. It is not clear whether
"disposition" would include the donation of organs or tissue for transplantation or
other medical purposes.
3. The decedent's directions as to donation would apparently override those of
his next of kin.
4. The donee may be a charitable, educational, or research institution or organi-
zation, or licensed hospital.
5. Donations may be made for scientific and medical purposes designated by the
donor or determined by the institution, organization, or hospital.
6. Gifts may be made by a will and shall be effective upon the death of the
testator or donor.
7. Donations, other than by will, may be made by an instrument executed by the
donor or some person in his presence, by his direction, and attested to in the presence
of the donor by two or more competent witnesses.
10. Revocation or modification is implied from other provisions, but actual mech-
anisms are not discussed.
11. No person acting in good faith pursuant to the directions contained in such
will or other instrument without knowledge of the subsequent revocation or modification,
if any, of such will or other instrument shall be liable to the surviving spouse or
next of kin for performing acts necessary to carry out the gift of the donor.
PENNSYLVANIA
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35, §§ 5001-03 (1964).
1. Any person may direct that any part of his remains be given.
3. If such a direction has been made, the person(s) otherwise entitled to control
the disposition of the remains of the decedent shall faithfully and promptly carry out
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the directions of the decedent.
4. Donations may be made to any nonprofit eye or body part bank. A written
donation shall authorize any representative of the donee to take the necessary action to
remove and preserve such material within 24 hours after the death of the donee and
shall not require the consent of the personal representative of the decedent. After the
removal of such material, the remains of the decedent shall be the responsibility of the
person(s) otherwise entitled to control the disposition of the remains of such decedent.
6. A gift may be made by will and shall be immediately carried out, regardless
of the validity of the will or the fact that it may not be offered for or admitted to probate
until a later date.
7. Donations may be made by a written instrument; no witnesses are required.
RHODE ISLAND
R.I. GEN_ LAws ANN. §§ 23-42-1 to -18 (1968).
1. Any person of legal age and sound mind may donate his remains.
2. Donations may also be made by the surviving spouse or the deceased's lawful
heirs. Any person who by law controls the disposition of the remains of a deceased
minor child may, by written instrument authorize a medical school to use said minor
decedent's body or any part thereof for any medical purpose. The operation of this sec-
tion applies to stillborn infants.
3. The right to control the disposition of the remains shall be in accord with the
following priority: the deceased, the spouse of the deceased, and any of the deceased's
lawful heirs.
4. Donations may be made to a "medical school," which is defined as a uni-
versity or college conducting a medical curriculum at the graduate level.
5. Donations may be used for such "medical purposes" as may have been desig-
nated, or in the absence of any such designation, for such "medical purposes" as the
named donee may determine.
6. Dispositions may be made by will.
7. Any donation shall be by written instrument signed by the person donating
and witnessed by two persons of legal age. No particular form or words shall be
necessary for such donation or authorization provided that the instrument conveys the
clear intention of the person making the donation.
10. Any such disposition may be revoked by the donor at any time prior to his
death by the execution and delivery to the donee, if one is specified, of a written in-
strument in the same manner as the original donative instrument. If the original in-
strument specifies no donee, the same shall be revoked by burning, tearing, or otherwise
destroying such and all executed copies thereof.
11. The director of health and his designate or designates shall not be liable to
any person for any act done in accomplishing the purposes of the act unless performed
in bad faith.
SOUTH CAROLINA
S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 9-521 to -527 (Supp. 1968).
1. Every person of full age and sound mind may give all or part of his anatomy.
4. Gifts may be made to the Board for Distribution of Dead Bodies. Upon the
death of the donor, the Board or its agent may claim the body and remove from the
donor that portion of his anatomy given to the Board; the Board or its agent shall use
reasonable care in removing that portion of the anatomy to avoid undue mutilation of
the body. The Board will cooperate with the surviving spouse of the next of kin in
carrying out satisfactory religious services.
5. The part of the donor's anatomy shall be used for the purpose specified in the
instrument. If no purpose is specified, the Board may use it in any manner authorized
by the act. It is not clear that the Board for Distribution of Dead Bodies has the
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authority to use the organs and tissue for transplantation since § 9-505 provides in part
that colleges and schools shall first be supplied with bodies needed for lectures and
demonstration. However, since the donor may specify the purpose, and no limitation is
included, authority to donate for transplantation probably exists.
7. A donation shall be made by a written instrument signed by the donor in the
presence of two competent witnesses and acknowledged before any person who is
authorized to take acknowledgments within the state. The written instrument shall be
deposited and retained on file in the probate court of the county wherein the donor
resides.
10. The gift of any person of all or a portion of his anatomy made pursuant to
the provisions of the act may be revoked by the donor by demanding return to him of
the written instrument of gift, and any duplicate originals thereof, from the Board or
person in possession of the same or by written instrument executed and filed in the
same manner as the original gift.
11. The Board and any person authorized by it to remove a portion of any donor's
anatomy shall not be liable for damages in any civil suit for the removal of that part
unless the gift has been revoked in the manner prescribed. Likewise, any person who
delivers or permits the removal of any part of the donor's anatomy, or fails to do such,
shall not be liable in any manner unless he has knowledge of a revocation.
SOUTH DAKOTA
S.D. CoMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 34-26-20 to -41 (Supp. 1969).
South Dakota has adopted the UNIFORM ANATOMICAL GIFT ACT in its entirety,
but has renumbered and rearranged the sections.
TENNESSEE
TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 32-601 to -608 (Supp. 1968).
1. Any person of sound mind and 21 years of age or older may dispose of the
whole or any part of his body.
3. If the donee shall elect to accept the gift, its rights and interests therein and
the right of possession shall be superior to the rights and interests of the surviving
spouse or next of kin. The surviving spouse and other next of kin who have actual
knowledge that the donor has disposed of his body or parts thereof in accordance with
the provisions of the act shall have no rights of possession and disposition of the body
of the donor until the donee has claimed and removed the portions of the body given
to it or has rejected the gift of the body or portions thereof.
4. The gift must name as donee a medical or dental institution that is in active
operation or the State Anatomical Commission. Upon the death of the donor, the donee
or its agent may take possession of the body of the donor and remove those portions
of the anatomy donated. The donee or its agents shall use reasonable care in removing
the portions of the anatomy so given to avoid unnecessary mutilation of the body. The
surviving spouse or next of kin shall have the right to claim the remainder of the body
and dispose of it by burial or by other customary and proper manner. If the donor has
given to the donee his entire body, the donee shall give the surviving spouse or next of
kin an opportunity to provide last rites for the deceased.
5. The donee shall use such gift for the purpose specified. If no purpose is
specified, the donee may use it for any medical or educational purpose.
6. Gifts may be made by a will or codicil and shall be valid regardless of the fact
that the document may not be offered for or admitted to probate until a later date.
7. All other written instruments shall be signed by the donor in the presence of
two competent witnesses and acknowledged before any person who is authorized to take
acknowledgments within the state. Such written instruments shall be delivered by the
donor to the donee.
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10. The gift may be revoked by the donor by notice to the donee and demand
that the donee return to him the written instrument of gift or, if the gift is contained in a
will or codicil, by any method legally effective to revoke a will.
11. The donee, any licensed medical practitioner, or medical or educational in-
stitution who removes the portions of any donor's anatomy or takes possession of the
body when the entire body is given shall not be liable for damages in any civil suit for
the removal of the portions so given or for possessing the body, unless the gift has been
revoked and the person or the institution involved has received actual notice of such
prior to removal or prior to taking possession of the body. Any person who delivers
or permits, or fails to deliver or permit, the removal of all or any portion of the donor's
anatomy shall not be liable in any manner unless he has actual knowledge of the revo-
cation or, in the latter case, has actual knowledge of the gift which has not been revoked.
TEXAS
Tux. Rnv. Civ. STAT. art. 4590-1 (1960), as amended, (Supp. 1968-69).
1. Any inhabitant of this state of legal age and of sound mind may arrange for
the disposition, after death, of his body or any organ, member, or part thereof.
4. Each instrument may designate the donee, but such shall not be necessary. A
donee may be an individual, hospital, institution, or a bank maintained for the storage,
preservation, and use of human bodies or the organs, members, or parts thereof. Pro-
vision is made for open-ended donations.
5. Gifts may be made only for the purpose of advancing medical science or for
the replacement or rehabilitation of diseased or worn out organs, members, or parts of
the bodies of living humans.
6. Gifts may be made by will.
7. Donations may be made by written instrument signed by the donor and wit-
nessed by two persons of legal age. No particular form or words shall be necessary,
provided the instrument conveys the clear intention of the person making the same.
10. The donor may revoke at any time prior to death any disposition previously
made by execution of a written instrument in the same or a similar manner as the
original donation and bequest.
11. The hospital or physician shall not be liable civilly or criminally for removing
said organs or any part thereof from the body, providing the donor has, prior to death,




VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, §§ 5231-37 (Supp. 1969).
Vermont has adopted the UNoRM ANATOMICAL GIFT AcT with some modifi-
cations. The most significant, for the purposes of this paper, is the alteration of section
2(a) to provide that any person of sound mind and 21 years of age may make a dona-
tion.
VIRGINIA
VA. CODE ANN. § 32-364.1 (1969).
1. Every inhabitant of this state of the age of 21 or older and of sound mind may
arrange for the disposition, after death, of his body or any part thereof.
2. The person(s) having the right to a body for burial may likewise consent to
such use of the body or any part thereof.
5. Donations must be made for the purpose of scientific use, other advancement
of medical science, or the replacement or rehabilitation of diseased parts of the bodies
of other humans.
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6. Donations may be made by will.
7. Donations may be made by an instrument executed in the same manner as a
will.
10. Any such disposition may be revoked by the testator or grantor at any time
prior to his death by the execution of a written instrument in the same manner as the
original grant.
WASHINGTON
WASH. REv. CODE ANN. §§ 68.08.250-.280 (1962).
1. Any person of legal age and sound mind may donate the whole or any part
of his remains.
2. and 3. Any person who has the right to control the disposition of the remains of
a deceased person may also authorize the use of the decedent's body or any part thereof,
unless contrary directions have been given by the decedent. The operation of this sec-
tion shall not be barred by the decedent's not having reached the age of majority.
This section shall also be applicable to stillborn infants.
4. Gifts may be made to a teaching institution, university, college, the Director
of Health of the State, any public or nonprofit therapeutic agency approved by the
Director of the State Board of Health under rules and regulations established by the
Director or Board or any legally licensed hospital.
5. Donations may be used for such "medical purposes" as may have been
designated, or in the absence of any such designation, for such medical purposes as the
named donee may determine.
7. Donations are made by executing a written instrument.
10. Written instruments of donation may be revoked by the donor in writing; and
if the instrument has been delivered to the donee, he shall redeliver it to the donor forth-
with upon receipt of the revocation.
11. A donee shall not be liable to any person for carrying out the decedent's
instructions.
WEST VIRGINIA
W. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 16-9-1 to -3 (1966) (authority provided for eyes only).
1. A person 21 years or older and of sound mind may prescribe the disposition,
after death, of his eyes or any part thereof.
2. The person(s) having the right to a body for burial may consent to such use
of the eyes or parts thereof.
4. Each instrument may designate the donee, but such shall not be necessary. A
donee may be an individual, hospital, institution, agency engaged in sight restoration,
or a bank maintained for the storage, preservation, and use of human eyes or parts
thereof. Provision is made for open-ended donations.
5. Donations must be made for the purpose of advancing medical science or for
the replacement or rehabilitation of diseased eyes or worn out or injured parts of the
eyes of living human beings.
7. Donations may be made by a dated written instrument signed by the person
making or giving the same and witnessed by two persons of legal age. No particular
form or words shall be necessary for such donation, provided the instrument conveys
the clear intention of the person making the same.
10. Any disposition may be revoked by the donor at any time prior to his death
by the execution of a written instrument in the same manner as the original grant.
11. No hospital, donee, or physician who reasonably relies upon a dispositive
instrument appearing to have been made in conformity with the provisions of the act




Wis. STAT. ANN. § 155.06 (Supp. 1969).
1. Every person 21 years or older and of sound mind may make a gift during his
lifetime of all or any part of his body.
3. Such body or parts thereof may be made available to a medical school or
bank after the death of the donor by the person having custody of the body.
4. The gift may be made to any medical school or bank handling parts of the
body. The donee may accept or reject the gift. If the donee accepts, he or his agent
may cause to be removed from the body that portion given to the donee. If the entire
body is given, it shall not be delivered to the donee or his agent until after the surviving
spouse or other person who assumes custody- of the body has had an opportunity to
provide a funeral service or other last rites for the deceased.
5. Gifts may be made for scientific, medical, or educational purposes.
7. Such a gift shall be evidenced by a written instrument signed by the donor and
two competent witnesses who know the signature to be that of the donor.
10. The gift may be revoked by the donor at any time during his lifetime.
11. No person acting in good faith to carry out the written directions of the donor
shall be liable for damages in any civil suit for his actions, notwithstanding the fact
that, for any reason, the supposed gift is invalid.
WYOMING
WYo. STAT. A.N. §§ 35-2211.1-.9 (Supp. 1969).
Wyoming has adopted the U~noR ANATOmICAL GnoT AcT in its entirety.
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Appendix C
Uniform Anatomical Gift Act
Final Draft
An act authorizing the gift of all or part of a human body after death for
specified purposes.
SECTION 1 [Definitions]
(a) "Bank or storage facility" means a facility licensed, accredited or approved
under the laws of any state for storage of human bodies or parts thereof.
(b) "Decedent" means a deceased individual and includes a stillborn infant or
fetus.
(c) "Donor" means an individual who makes a gift of all or part of his body.
(d) "Hospital" means a hospital licensed, accredited or approved under the
laws of any state and includes a hospital operated by the United States government,
a state, or a subdivision thereof, although not required under state laws.
(e) "Part" includes organs, tissues, eyes, bones, arteries, blood, other fluids and
other portions of a human body, and "part" includes "parts."
(f) "Person" means an individual, corporation, government or governmental
subdivision or agency, business trust, estate, trust, partnership or association or any
other legal entity.
(g) "Physician" or "surgeon" means a physician or surgeon licensed or authorized
to practice under the laws of any state.
(h) "State" includes any state, district, commonwealth, territory, insular posses-
sion, and any other area subject to the legislative authority of the United States of
America.
SECTION 2 [Persons Who May Execute an Anatomical Gift]
(a) Any individual of sound mind and 18 years of age or more may give all or
any part of his body for any purposes specified in Section 3, the gift to take effect upon
death.
(b) Any of the following persons, in order of priority stated, when persons in
prior classes are not available at the time of death, and in the absence of actual notice of
contrary indications by the decedent, or actual notice of opposition by a member of the
same or a prior class, may give all or any part of the decedent's body for any purposes
specified in Section 3:
(1) the spouse,
(2) an adult son or daughter,
(3) either parent,
(4) an adult brother or sister,
(5) a guardian of the person of the decedent at the time of his death,
(6) any other person authorized or under obligation to dispose of the body.
(c) If the donee has actual notice of contrary indications by the decedent, or that
a gift by a member of a class is opposed by a member of the same or a prior class, the
donee shall not accept the gift. The persons authorized by subsection (b) may make
the gift after death or immeditely before death.
(d) A gift of all or part of a body authorizes any examination necessary to assure
medical acceptability of the gift for the purposes intended.
(e) The rights of the donee created by the gift are paramount to the right of
others except as provided by Section 7(d).
SECTION 3 [Persons Who May Become Donees, and Purposes for Which
Anatomical Gifts May Be Made] The following persons may become donees of gifts
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of bodies or parts thereof for the purposes stated:
(1) any hospital, surgeon, or physician, for medical or dental education,
research, advancement of medical or dental science, therapy or transplantation; or
(2) any accredited medical or dental school, college or university for
education, research, advancement of medical or dental science or therapy; or
(3 any bank or storage facility, for medical or dental education, research,
advancement of medical or dental science, therapy or transplantation; or
(4) any specified individual for therapy or transplantation needed by him.
SECTION 4 [Manner of Executing Anatomical Gifts]
(a) A gift of all or part of the body under Section 2(a) may be made by will.
The gift becomes effective upon the death of the testator without waiting for probate.
If the will is not probated, or if it is declared invalid for testamentary purposes, the
gift, to the extent that it has been acted upon in good faith, is nevertheless valid and
effective.
(b) A gift of all or part of the body under Section 2(a) may also be made by
document other than a will. The gift becomes effective upon the death of the
donor. The document, which may be a card designed to be carried on the person, must
be signed by the donor, in the presence of 2 witnesses who must sign the document in
his presence. If the donor cannot sign, the document may be signed for him at his
direction and in his presence, and in the presence of 2 witnesses who must sign the
document in his presence. Delivery of the document of gift during the donor's life-
time is not necessary to make the gift valid.
(c) The gift may be made to a specified donee or without specifying a donee.
If the latter, the gift may be accepted by the attending physician as donee upon or
following death. If the gift is made to a specified donee who is not available at the
time and place of death, the attending physician upon or following death, in the absence
of any expressed indication that the donor desired otherwise, may accept the gift as
donee. The physician who becomes a donee under this subsection shall not participate in
the procedures for removing or transplanting a part.
(d) Notwithstanding Section 7(b), the donor may designate in his will, card or
other document of gift the surgeon or physician to carry out the appropriate procedures.
In the absence of a designation, or if the designee is not available, the donee or other
person authorized to accept the gift may employ or authorize any surgeon or physician
for the purpose.
(e) Any gift by a person designated in Section 2(b) shall be made by a document
signed by him, or made by his telegraphic, recorded telephonic or other recorded mes-
sage.
SECTION 5 [Delivery of Document of Gift] If the gift is made by the donor to
a specified donee, the will, card or other document, or an executed copy thereof, may
be delivered to the donee to expedite the appropriate procedures immediately after
death, but delivery is not necessary to the validity of the gift. The will, card or other
document, or an executed copy thereof, may be deposited in any hospital, bank or
storage facility or registry office that accepts them for safekeeping or for facilitation of
procedures after death. On request of any interested party upon or after the donor's
death, the person in possession shall produce the document for examination.
SECTION 6 [Amendment or Revocation of the Gift]
(a) If the will, card or other document or executed copy thereof, has been de-
livered to a specified donee, the donor may amend or revoke the gift by:
(1) the execution and delivery to the donee of a signed statement, or
(2) an oral statement made in the presence of 2 persons and communicated
to the donee, or
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(3) a statement during a terminal illness or injury addressed to an at-
tending physician and communicated to the donee, or
(4) a signed card or document found on his person or in his effects.
(b) Any document of gift which has not been delivered to the donee may be
revoked by the donor in the manner set out in subsection (a) or by destruction, cancella-
tion, or mutilation of the document and all executed copies thereof.
(c) Any gift made by a will may also be amended or revoked in the manner
provided for amendment or revocation of wills, or as provided in subsection (a).
SECTION 7 [Rights and Duties at Death)
(a) The donee may accept or reject the gift. If the donee accepts a gift of the
entire body, he may, subject to the terms of the gift, authorize embalming and the use
the body in funeral services. If the gift is of a part of the body, the donee, upon the
death of the donor and prior to embalming, shall cause the part to be removed without
unnecessary mutilation. After removal of the part, custody of the remainder of the
body vests in the surviving spouse, next of kin or other persons under obligation to
dispose of the body.
(b) The time of death shall be determined by a physician who attends the donor
at his death, or, if none, the physician who certifies the death. This physician shall
not participate in the procedures for removing or transplanting a part.
(c) A person who acts in good faith in accord with the terms of this Act, or
under the anatomical gift laws of another state [or a foreign country] is not liable for
damages in any civil action or subject to prosecution in any criminal proceeding for
his act.
(d) The provisions of this Act are subject to the laws of this state prescribing
powers and duties with respect to autopsies.
SECTION 8 [Uniformity of Interpretation] This Act shall be so construed as to
effectuate its general purpose to make uniform the law of those states which enact it.
SECTION 9 [Short Title] This Act may be cited as the Uniform Anatomical
Gift Act.




SECTION 11 [Time of Taking Effect] This Act shall take effect. . ..
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